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ABSTRACT
EXPLORING POLITICAL CONSUMERISM: ITS ANTECEDENTS AND
MEDIATING ROLE BETWEEN FAMILY COMMUNICATION AND
POLITICAL ACTIVITY

Hannah Swarm, B.A.
Marquette University, 2022

Viewed as an unconventional approach to politics, political consumerism is a
rising form of political action that allows citizens to make political statements with their
wallets. However, more research is warranted examining its motivating factors, as well as
its connection to other forms of political activity. The family unit is the primary
antecedent examined in this study, as it is regarded as one of the most important
socializing agents for children, especially when it comes to political development.
Conducting a national survey of 523 U.S. adults, the present study explored how one’s
family communication environment during childhood affects their likelihood of engaging
in political consumerism during adulthood, and in turn, how that influences their
involvement in offline and online political activity.
Through multiple regression analysis, the results showed that both the
conversation and conformity orientations are positively associated with boycotting and
buycotting. Path analysis further revealed the mediating role of political consumption on
the relationship between family communication and political activity. Overall, this study
expands the understanding of family communication patterns theory and suggests that
political consumers are involved in various forms of political activity. The results further
point to the growing trend of “dual participation,” whereby citizens combine offline and
online political activities.
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INTRODUCTION
According to the 2020 American National Election Studies (ANES) Time-Series
Study, the majority of respondents (57.7%) claimed to have either bought or declined to
purchase a certain product or service for political or social reasons. Of those who
deliberately purchased or avoided products from certain companies, 22.6% reported
engaging in this behavior about half of the time or more in the past 12 months. In fact,
respondents reported engaging in political consumerism over the past year more than
other political activities, such as joining a protest march, rally, or demonstration (9.4%),
contacting an elected state or local official (17.5%), signing a petition (28.4%), or posting
political comments online (38.7%) (ANES, 2021). This data suggests that as the avenues
of political participation undergo continuous expansion, Americans are more regularly
adopting political consumerism as a viable means of political action.
Although traditional modes of political activity, like voting, remain important
tools of participation, citizens are adopting less direct and less formal means of trying to
influence public policy. Political consumerism is one form of participation that has grown
over the decades and has continuously attracted more scholarly attention (e.g., Stolle et
al., 2005). According to Gotlieb and Cheema (2017), the growing prevalence of political
consumerism indicates a larger societal shift in younger citizens’ values, norms, and
practices. Those who engage in political consumerism deliberately choose certain
products and producers based on social, political, or ethical considerations (Shah et al.,
2007). This mode of political activity provides an alternative way of expressing
dissatisfaction, especially since companies vigilantly monitor consumer behavior and
have become more responsive to these efforts (Shah et al., 2007).
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Consumers have continually leveraged their purchasing power to punish and
reward companies for their business practices. Concerns over unethical labor practices
and unfavorable social, political, and environmental policies can lead consumers to be
more conscientious about the type of brands they choose to support via their wallet. For
example, in 2019, clients and celebrities were quick to say they planned to cancel their
Equinox and SoulCycle memberships after the fitness company, which was seen as an
inclusive brand that had supported LGBTQ+ charities in the past, was found to have
corporate ties to former president Donald Trump (Jennings, 2019). In 2020, calls to
boycott Starbucks erupted on social media after an internal dress code memo prohibited
employees from wearing Black Lives Matter apparel on the job. In response, Starbucks
quickly reversed their policy, showing the power of consumers to influence company
practices and policies (Murphy, 2020). These are just a couple of the countless examples
showing how consumers use their power in the marketplace.
As Shah et al. (2007) argue, political consumerism merits “special attention”
because it affects “a large cross-section of the citizenry” and has grown to influence and
“structure a wide range of consumer decisions” (p. 219). However, questions remain
regarding how people come to engage in political consumerism. The family has been
found to play a key role in shaping children’s political beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors.
While some families may refrain from political talk and be less tolerant of sharing
different opinions, open family communication environments may welcome political
discussions and encourage debate (Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002a). These differences have
been well-researched, with scholars examining how different family communication
styles are related to various political outcomes, such as political efficacy and political
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participation (e.g., Graham et al., 2020). Although the link between family
communication and political participation has been examined, scant research exists
regarding the specific relationship between family communication and political
consumerism. To fill this gap, the present study examines how one’s family
communication environment during childhood influences their political involvement, and
specifically their political consumption, during adulthood.
Scholars have also asserted that political consumerism deserves “more explicit
attention” in future research examining political participation (Stolle et al., 2005, p. 262).
Having political consumerism at one’s disposal expands the very definition of political
participation; beyond targeting politicians and political systems, citizens can influence
public policy via numerous market actors (Stolle et al., 2005). Citizens who are already
politically active are the ones who typically engage in political consumerism (Strømsnes,
2009). By taking part in this form of individualized activism, political consumers
demonstrate high initiative and prove to be politically efficacious (Newman & Bartels,
2011; Stolle et al., 2005). Therefore, it is important to investigate how one’s propensity
for engaging in political consumerism affects their entire repertoire of political activity.
Specifically, this study explores how political consumption habits relate to additional
participation in offline and online political activity. To provide a foundation for this
study, the following sections conceptualize political consumerism, explain family
communication patterns theory, and discuss potential antecedents to political
consumption and additional forms of political activity.

4
LITERATURE REVIEW

Conceptualizing Political Consumerism
Political consumerism is a form of political participation that is characterized by a
consumer’s intentional decision to avoid (i.e., boycott) or purchase (i.e., buycott) certain
products or brands based on political, social, or ethical considerations (Baek, 2010; Stolle
et al., 2005). While boycotting products or brands is a means of punishing a company for
objectionable policies or business practices, buycotting products or services is a way of
rewarding a company for their favorable business practices (Copeland & Boulianne,
2020). Whereas the average consumer selects products or services based on price, taste,
and quality, political consumers have a distinct goal and rationale behind their shopping
behaviors (Micheletti, 2003; Strømsnes, 2009). They use their market choices to convey
political values and policy positions in hopes of creating tangible political, economic, and
social outcomes (Newman & Bartels, 2011). Political consumerism can raise the
consciousness of consumers and oblige companies to alter their production methods
(Micheletti, 2003). Acts of political consumption can also be directed at addressing noneconomic issues that pertain to personal and family well-being (Micheletti, 2003).
Through this form of civic engagement, individual purchasing decisions are “imbued
with political beliefs, ethics, or principles,” thus allowing private consumption choices to
shed light on larger, more public concerns (Neilson & Paxton, 2010, p. 5). Political
consumerism is regarded as another avenue of political participation, quite different from
more formal or institutionalized modes (Shah et al., 2007). Despite the ascendancy of
multinational corporations, political consumers believe in the power of consumers to
shape a fair and ethical marketplace (Neilson, 2010). As market actors have become
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increasingly popular targets for citizens looking to make political statements,
environmental practices, labor standards, and human rights issues have become
increasingly prominent in the marketing of global products and services (Dalton, 2008).
Ultimately, the idea of political consumption urges citizens to consider the influence of
business on international trade, global politics, business ethics, and its outcomes for
government and citizen participation in public affairs (Micheletti, 2003).
Although scholarly interest in political consumerism is growing, there has been
debate surrounding whether political consumerism is political, as its actions are not
always directed at the state. However, as Copeland (2014a) points out, many instances of
political consumerism involve the production of public goods, which fits within the broad
domain of politics. Consumption provides a “venue” into policymaking; since consumer
behavior is generally unregulated, people excluded from policymaking arenas can
leverage their market choices as a means of political expression (Micheletti, 2003, p. 12).
Micheletti (2003) further explains that a political connection exists between our daily
consumer choices and key global issues related to environmental protection, labor rights,
and human rights. Therefore, consumer choices, traditionally considered to be private,
have become politicized, dissolving the barrier between political and economic spheres.
Additionally, political consumerism is tied to power relations and the allocation of
societal values, which are largely determined by private actors (Micheletti, 2003;
Newman & Bartels, 2011). Many citizens have greater feelings of political efficacy at the
marketplace and view corporations as viable political targets, which has given rise to the
politics of products and brands (Echegaray, 2015).
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Even though political consumerism is receiving more scholarly attention, the
phenomenon has been around for a long time. Political consumerism can be traced back
to boycotts, which citizens have used for hundreds of years to protest injustices
(Micheletti, 2003). In fact, the term “boycott” was named after Captain Charles
Cunningham Boycott of Ireland, who owned a large amount of agricultural land worked
on by the Irish peasantry. In the 1880s, the poor working conditions sparked discontent
among the peasants who eventually took action against Boycott, refusing to harvest his
oats and eventually breaking all contact with him. Although their actions would be
labeled as a strike today, the newspapers described the peasants’ efforts as a “boycott.”
Nonetheless, the peasants’ actions conveyed a similar main idea: common people could
collectively wield their economic power to instigate change (Micheletti, 2003).
Regularly used household products have been and continue to be a primary target
of political consumerist activities. For example, between the 1920s and 1940s,
dissatisfaction with the price of food prompted American housewives to publicly express
their discontent and boycott food products. These actions cut across geographical, ethnic,
and religious lines, uniting women in the fight against high food prices. Aside from
bonding the women, the boycotts politized motherhood, the family, and the home
(Micheletti, 2003). Furthermore, boycotts have been utilized across the world to protest
civil rights violations. In the United States, for example, the 1955 Montgomery bus
boycott took place to protest racial segregation on the public transit system (Micheletti,
2003; Stolle et al., 2005). Consumer action has also proven to raise awareness and
influence industry changes; one instance of this is the boycott against the food
manufacturer Nestlé (1977–1984) for its marketing of infant formula to countries in
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Africa and Asia, where the product was linked to increased levels of infant mortality
(Micheletti, 2003; Stolle et al., 2005). The boycott took place on the international stage
and forced a well-known, multinational company to collaborate alongside the World
Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations International Children’s Emergency
Fund (UNICEF). It led to the 1981 adoption of the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes, and although companies found loopholes in the code, the boycott
demonstrated how consumer action can influence the policymaking process (Micheletti,
2003). The above examples, albeit far from an exhaustive list, highlight the presence of
political consumerism throughout history, whether it be used to fight for social justice,
labor rights, product accessibility, ethical marketing tactics, and more. Now, it is
important to understand how the modes of political engagement have shifted in recent
decades, increasing the visibility of political consumerism among citizens and scholars as
a tool for political action.
Beginning in the 1970s, America began to see a decline in more traditional means
of political participation (e.g., attend a political rally, participate in campaigns,
correspond with elected officials) as economic globalization transformed manufacturing,
marketing, finance, labor, and consumption (Bennett, 2012). Decreased election turnout
in the United States, as well as in most Western democracies, caused worry among many
political analysts who may have associated it with waning political interest. However,
this downward trend has given rise to new patterns of participation and redefined what it
means to be an engaged citizen in a democracy. As society has undergone modernization,
there has been an evolution of citizenship norms, the emergence of new political
resources, and the adoption of new political skills among citizens (Dalton, 2008). As
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Dalton (2008) points out, more traditional means of participation can be associated with
duty-based citizenship, which has a narrower view of participation and discourages
citizens from engaging in challenging activities that give them more of a direct say in
politics. Therefore, the decline in duty-based citizenship has made room for impactful
non-electoral modes of political action that afford citizens greater control over the focus
and site of political action, and as a result, expands their influence in the political sphere
(Dalton, 2008). Moreover, this shift away from duty-based citizenship has brought about
a period of “personalized politics” in which citizens mobilize around personal lifestyle
values and target various political actors aside from parties, candidates, and the
government (e.g., corporations, brands, international organizations) (Bennett, 2012;
Copeland, 2014a; Stolle et al., 2005, p. 251). As the nature of citizenship has evolved,
citizens have adopted more direct means of political action, such as political
consumerism, to influence policy makers. Rather than an unpromising decline in civic
participation, the rise of political consumerism and other non-electoral methods of
political activity have signaled a revitalization of democratic participation (Dalton, 2008).
On a global scale, previous data from the World Values Survey (WVS) indicates
that participation in boycotts has grown steadily over the decades. In 1999, boycotting
was more than four times as likely to occur compared to 1974 (Stolle et al., 2005). More
recent studies examining political consumption in the U.S. and Europe have found that
the percentage of citizens who engage in at least one form of political consumerism
ranges from 28% to nearly 50%, which confirms political consumption’s status as a
widely adopted method of political activity (Baek, 2010; Newman & Bartels, 2011;
Strømsnes, 2009). Political consumerism has gained public acceptance in other regions of

9
the world, such as Latin America, where between 15% and 29% of citizens elect political
consumption as a way of influencing the political system (Echegaray, 2015). Citizen
involvement in political consumerism varies globally, with it being particularly
pronounced in places like Scandinavia (Stolle et al., 2005). Nonetheless, political
consumerism has gained global recognition as a valuable means of political activity.
A collection of societal changes, including the move from industrial to postindustrial economies, the shift from materialist to post-materialist values, and an increase
in educational opportunities provided a foundation for the expansion of political
consumerism (Copeland, 2014a). Specifically, Micheletti (2003) attributes citizens’
increasing involvement in political consumerism to the rising dependence on the global
marketplace for the delivery of goods and services. Whether people recognize it or not,
shopping has become a survival mechanism given that nowadays few people produce
their own food and clothing. Citizens have also become increasingly concerned about the
origins and the impact of certain products, as globalization has lengthened the commodity
chain of products and made it more difficult to track (Micheletti, 2003). Another driving
factor is that many citizens “are now seeking issues and arenas for involvement that are
more flexible, network-oriented, hands-on and that allows them to combine their daily
lives with political causes” (Micheletti, 2003, p. 24-24). Particularly in the Western
world, increased wealth has given some people the opportunity to consider additional
facets of a product aside from price and quality (e.g., environmental impact) (Micheletti,
2003). The growth of political consumerism has also been facilitated by the emergence
and pervasiveness of the Internet, e-commerce, and social media (Gil de Zúñiga et al.,
2014a; Kelm & Dohle, 2018).
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Clearly, myriad forces have contributed to the growth of political consumerism as
a practical and appealing means of political action. Political consumption can be driven
by various reasons, whether issues of sustainability, worker’s rights, political party
affiliation, or social justice be at the forefront of an individual’s purchasing decisions.
However, for the purposes of this study, political consumerism is broadly defined as a
form of political activity involving the conscious decision to refrain from or seek out
certain products, services, or producers based on political, social, ethical, or
environmental reasons.
Types of Political Consumers: Boycotters and Buycotters
There are two main forms of political consumerism: boycotting and buycotting.
Both forms of consumerism are viewed as means of “lifestyle politics,” wherein everyday
life provides opportunities to make political statements (Copeland & Boulianne, 2020, p.
4). Individuals who boycott deliberately avoid purchasing products or brands because
they disagree with the company’s practices or policies. Conversely, those who buycott
intentionally purchase products or services because the company producing the product
operates under favorable and ethical practices. Requests to buycott are typically
associated with messages to “shop local” or with campaigns supporting companies that
provide a living wage, use sustainable resources, or adhere to fair trade standards (Kam &
Deichert, 2020). While boycotting aims to punish a company by damaging their
reputation, good will, or bottom lines, buycotting intends to reward a company for its
positive behavior (Copeland, 2014a). Previous scholars have found that different
motivational characteristics prompt people to boycott and buycott. Boycotting is
considered a form of collective action; networks of boycotters are often larger and highly
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interconnected (Friedman, 1999; Jungblut & Johnen, 2021). Due to the collective nature
of boycotts and the need for organized efforts, offline and online communication
activities have been found to influence boycotts more than buycotts (Kelm & Dohle,
2018). Copeland (2014a) suggested that boycotting is more strongly associated with
dutiful citizenship norms, which emphasize obligation, loyalty to the state, and deference
to authority. Due to this connection, boycotting has more characteristics in common with
traditional interest-based politics, such as voting in elections or working for a political
campaign (Copeland, 2014a).
Buycotting, on the other hand, shares more similarities with civic engagement
since it entails more informal and cooperative activity that takes place outside of
traditional political institutions. It involves the enactment of engaged citizenship norms,
which emphasize voluntary activity, forming independent opinions, and aiding others
(Copeland, 2014a). Since buycotting is more individualistic, self-motivated, and driven
by civic engagement, buycotters typically possess higher political interest (Jungblut &
Johnen, 2021) and are more altruistic compared to boycotters (Neilson, 2010). Avoiding
purchases involves less effort than seeking out specific brands or products, which led
Neilson (2010) to argue that more altruistic people are motivated to engage in the
complex process of buycotting because it is satisfying and fulfills their inherent desire to
benefit the well-being of others. This may also explain why buycotters tend to target
smaller or independent businesses, while boycotters often focus on targeting market
leaders and attracting media attention to promote broader industry change (Neilson,
2010).
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Political consumers may engage in both boycotting and buycotting behaviors,
which scholars have referred to as ‘dualcotting.’ These individuals have been found to
possess distinct characteristics as well, which may explain their motivations for engaging
in both means of political consumerism. For example, Baek (2010) found that dualcotters
demonstrate higher levels of political knowledge and they follow politics more closely.
Furthermore, Copeland (2014a) determined that dualcotters exhibit higher levels of
external efficacy, have higher income levels, and possess strong ideological views.
Neilson (2010) also characterized dualcotters as more altruistic than boycotters and
buycotters and suggested that dualcotters may be intensified versions of buycotters.
Likewise, Copeland (2014a) posited that buycotters, who already choose to reward
companies through purchasing goods, will likely consider boycotting goods or brands
with incongruent values. Due to this, dualcotters will likely resemble buycotters more
than boycotters in regard to citizenship norms.
The efficacy of boycotting and buycotting is important to consider, as well.
Boycotting often builds strong networks, and its attempts to mobilize citizens through
feelings of disapproval may be more effective than a reward-based mobilization strategy.
This may be explained by negativity bias, or the stronger propensity to perceive and
process negative stimuli compared to positive stimuli (Jungblut & Johnen, 2021).
Consistent with this idea, Kam and Deichert (2020) found that negative information
provokes boycotting far more powerfully than positive information induces buycotting.
The effectiveness of boycotts may also be attributed to them often containing overt
conflict between organized groups and corporations, which allows them to gain more
traction via the mass media (Copeland, 2014a). Despite these distinctions, it is critical to
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remember that boycotting and buycotting involve more complex decisions. The decision
to deliberately avoid a product or brand is more feasible if there is an available alternative
of similar price and quality, and the decision to intentionally buy a certain product or
brand is much easier when there is a minimal gap between comparable products in terms
of price and quality (Kam & Deichert, 2020). Therefore, the product market plays a key
role in political consumption efforts because if a product or brand performs far better than
any of its competitors or alternatives, attempts to boycott or buycott may be less potent.
Antecedents to Political Consumerism
Previous research has sought to define the political consumer through examining
political behaviors and socio-demographic factors. Regarding political tendencies, prior
research has found that those who possess high levels of political interest (e.g.,
Strømsnes, 2009) and political knowledge (Baek, 2010; Endres & Panagopoulos, 2017)
are more likely to engage in political consumerism. The possession of postmaterialist
values also increases the likelihood of political consumption, since these individuals
make material choices while weighing ethical or political concerns (Copeland, 2014b).
Further, political consumers are often distrustful or critical of government agents and
institutions (Stolle et al., 2005). This overall lack of trust stems from the fact that political
consumers may perceive political parties and government institutions as inept at
effectively addressing their political concerns, which motivates them to boycott and
buycott (Copeland, 2014b). Some scholars have found that boycotters exhibit lower
levels of political trust compared to buycotters (Copeland, 2014a; Neilson, 2010).
Explaining these results, Neilson (2010) posited that trust toward institutions inspires
positive behavior, and thus, encourages buycotting. Meanwhile, a lack of trust in
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institutions elicits feelings of frustration and dissatisfaction linked to negative corporate
behavior, which encourages boycotting.
Generalized trust is another key variable to consider. For example, Neilson (2010)
found that more trusting individuals are more prone to buycott than boycott, perhaps
because buycotting is more covert and operates largely on the assumption that others are
taking similar action while boycotting is often portrayed in the media as a collective act.
In line with the individualized nature of political consumerism, Newman and Bartels
(2011) discovered that political consumption is enhanced by “a deep-seated discontent
regarding the current state of things in one’s life” (p. 814). Another positive predictor of
political consumerism, especially buycotting, is association involvement, or one’s
participation in various types of associations such as sports teams, voluntary
organizations, and social clubs (Neilson, 2010). In general, people involved in
organizations are more likely to be asked to participate in politics and follow through
with the request (Verba et al., 1995). Therefore, membership in an organization could
lead to individuals being asked and subsequently motivated to boycott or buycott a
product, service, or brand (Copeland & Boulianne, 2020).
Ideological intensity is also an important factor, with those who identify as very
liberal or very conservative being more likely to participate in boycotts and buycotts than
those who identify as moderate (Copeland, 2014b; Endres & Panagopoulos, 2017).
Comparing the two ideological camps, Hooghe and Goubin (2022) found that political
consumerism was practiced more by those with a left-wing political orientation.
Moreover, scholars have concluded that Democrats are more active political consumers
compared to Republicans (Endres & Panagopoulos, 2017; Strømsnes, 2009). However,
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somewhat inconsistent with these findings, Baek (2010) concluded that buycotters were
more likely to identify as Republican and conservative while boycotters were more likely
to identify as Democrat and liberal. Additionally, Endres and Panagopoulos (2017) found
that partisans with more stable policy positions were more active in recent boycotts and
buycotts compared to partisans with less consistent positions. Although partisan
distinctions are important to consider, it should be noted that political consumers are less
prone to identify with a political party; many of these individuals are “ideologically
sophisticated,” meaning that they can effectively participate in politics independent of
“partisan cues” (Copeland, 2014b, p. 276).
Considering the impact of socio-demographic factors, prior research has indicated
that women (e.g., Hooghe & Goubin, 2022; Stolle et al., 2005), younger individuals (e.g.,
Newman & Bartels, 2011), those who are well-educated (e.g., Hooghe & Goubin, 2022;
Strømsnes, 2009), and those with a high income (Micheletti & Stolle, 2005) are more
likely to be political consumers. Due to its “indeterminacy” and “looseness,” political
consumerism may be more appealing to younger individuals and women who tend to be
more alienated from the formal political sphere (Micheletti, 2003, p. 17). The popularity
of political consumerism among women may further be explained by their higher
involvement in marketplace activities, as they often assume the traditional role of
shopping for the family (Micheletti, 2003; Neilson, 2010). Nevertheless, findings related
to socio-demographic factors have been inconsistent, especially with regard to gender and
income. For example, Copeland (2014a) found no clear gender or income differences
when dividing political consumers into boycotters and buycotters; yet, significant
differences emerged for dualcotters, with them being more likely to be female and earn
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higher levels of income. Contrary to these findings, Neilson (2010) found significant
gender differences between boycotters and buycotters, revealing that women are 53%
more likely to buycott than men, while gender does not influence the probability of
boycotting.
Although political consumers possess some common characteristics, they are not
a uniform group, and their nuanced behaviors are important to take into consideration.
Defining the political consumer is not only a task undertaken by academic researchers,
but it is an important variable for any business. The politics of a product can escalate into
controversial issues for corporations, as history has proven, which makes it imperative for
companies to carefully consider how and why it manufactures products (Micheletti,
2003). Poor labor practices and values that are incompatible with consumers’ values can
elicit negative reactions that damage a company’s reputation and good will. Large-scale
boycotts and buycotts can impact corporate policy, company personnel, and public
perception of a company, and they can even lead to public policy changes (Kam &
Deichert, 2020). Acts of political consumerism may also result in financial consequences
for companies, and the threat of financial loss alone can be enough to amend corporate
policies.
Even though a consumer decision may seem unrelated to politics, political
identity can have subtle and nuanced effects on consumer behaviors (Jung & Mittal,
2019). Jung and Mittal (2019) describe political identity as a broad concept comprised of
“a wide array of attitudes, motives, logics, and interpretations of how the world works,
how the world should work, and how societies may approach various issues and
problems” (p. 69). Therefore, a variety of political issues can impact consumption
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choices. For example, according to Gromet et al. (2013), environmental protection
through government-mandated sustainability efforts is a key issue on the liberal agenda,
which in turn, makes conservatives less likely to purchase an energy-efficient product
linked to environmental benefits. Although this is just one example, empirical research
has demonstrated that consumers evaluate products and brands more favorably if they are
presented in a way that corresponds to their political identity. Therefore, brands should
consider their political image from a consumer standpoint, which is composed of various
elements including the CEO’s political endorsements, how the brand responds to social
issues, and communication with consumers (Jung & Mittal, 2019).
In general, it is crucial for companies to examine their customer base as they
navigate their political brand communication, especially given that boycotters’ punitiveoriented actions can be particularly damaging to a brand’s success (Jungblut & Johnen,
2021). A broad, heterogeneous group of consumers possessing a variety of political views
may pose more challenges for brands trying to position themselves toward political
issues, as they may run the risk of losing certain customers. This risk is intensified by
today’s growing political polarization (Jungblut & Johnen, 2021). Additionally, based on
Neilson’s (2010) findings, differences among boycotters’ and buycotters’ thought
processes can influence corporate messaging strategies. Given that boycotters tend to
have less trust in institutions, companies targeted by boycotters could recruit trustworthy
third parties to endorse their products. Conversely, since buycotters experience higher
trust in institutions, companies may preemptively craft messages that promote their social
responsibility efforts (Neilson, 2010).
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While political indicators and socio-demographic factors have been traced to
political consumption behaviors, its communicative antecedents beg further exploration.
Previous literature suggests that communication within offline and online networks can
affect one’s involvement in political consumption. For example, Baek (2010) concluded
that individuals who are more active communicators (i.e., frequent political discussions
with family or friends, news consumption, and entertainment program viewing) and are
devoted information seekers are more likely to be active political consumers. The same
effect has been found in the social media context, as more active users are more likely to
be political consumers (Endres & Panagopoulos, 2017; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2014a).
However, further research is warranted regarding these different communicative aspects.
Specifically, the family, a driving force in shaping political attitudes and behaviors,
should be examined to determine whether different family communication styles
stimulate political consumption.
Family Communication Patterns as a Key Antecedent?
The family is a unique relational system that has a profound influence on one’s
beliefs, values, and communication behaviors (Rauscher et al., 2020). Family
communication patterns theory (FCPT) reflects the dynamic communication
environments that exist within the family unit by examining how parent-child interactions
create a shared social reality among families and teach children different orientations to
communication (i.e., conversation and conformity orientations) (McLeod & Chaffee,
1972; Rauscher et al., 2020). The conversation orientation and the conformity orientation
are the two main dimensions of the theory that denote different family communication
styles. Researchers have drawn on FCPT for nearly 50 years to examine the effects of
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conversation and conformity orientations on family member behaviors (Rauscher et al.,
2020, Schrodt et al., 2008). When McLeod and Chaffee (1972) developed the Family
Communication Patterns (FCP) scale, they originally labeled the two dimensions of
family communication concept-oriented and socio-oriented. The concept-orientation
indicated the extent to which parental discussions of ideas influenced children’s
understanding and decision-making, while the socio-orientation represented the degree to
which social roles and relationships bear greater influence on children’s decision-making
(Schrodt et al., 2008). This means that a family high in concept-orientation prioritized
ideas over relationships, which allowed for differing opinions to be shared among family
members. Meanwhile, a family high in socio-orientation prioritized harmonious parentchild relationship over ideas, meaning that conflict was avoided to maintain agreeable
family relationships (Schrodt et al., 2008). Based on the interplay between these two
dimensions, McLeod and Chaffee (1972) generated four distinct family types: consensual
(i.e., high in both dimensions), pluralistic (i.e., high concept-orientation, low socioorientation), protective (i.e., high socio-orientation, low concept-orientation), and laissezfaire (i.e., low in both dimensions).
McLeod and Chaffee’s (1972) initial inquiry paved the way for future research
investigating the dynamic family communication environment. Specifically, the theory of
FCP originated from McLeod and Chaffee’s (1972) research examining the degree of
association between children’s interpretations of mass media messages and
communication patterns acquired through the family (Buckner et al., 2013; Ledbetter &
Schrodt, 2008). A second wave of FCP research was initiated by Ritchie (1991), who
reconceptualized the two underlying dimensions of FCP to create a more comprehensive
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understanding of their behavioral characteristics (Schrodt et al., 2008). FCP became seen
as not only indicative of information processing, but also of family communication
climates (Buckner et al., 2013). Further, the approach to analyzing FCP, which was
originally based on the assumption that the FCP scales measure what actually occurs in
the family, was improved upon by measuring respondent’s perceptions of the family
instead (Ritchie, 1991). The concept-orientation was renamed the conversation
orientation to denote the free exchange of ideas between parents and children, and the
socio-orientation was renamed the conformity orientation to reflect obedience to parental
authority (Richie, 1991; Schrodt et al., 2008). Rather than binary, these two orientations
are continuous as a family could be high and/or low on both the conversation and
conformity orientations (Graham et al., 2020). The conversation and conformity
orientations have been found to foster family communication environments that endure
across different generations of family (Rauscher et al., 2020).
The conversation orientation represents the degree to which families create a
communication atmosphere that invites all family members to engage in unrestrained
discussions about a range of topics (Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002b). Families high in the
conversation dimension engage in open, frequent, and spontaneous interactions with each
other “without many limitations in regard to time spent in interaction or topics discussed”
(Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002a, p. 85). All family members are involved in the
discussions regarding the activities the family plans to participate in together, and
decisions are made as a family unit (Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002b). Families who are low
in the conversation orientation interact less regularly and refrain from discussing many
topics openly with one another (Buckner et al., 2013). Private thoughts, feelings, and

21
behaviors are rarely discussed with other family members, and family decisions are not
made collectively (Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002b). Meanwhile, the conformity orientation
reflects the degree to which family interactions promote a communication environment
built on harmony, agreement, and obedience to authority figures. Families high in the
conformity orientation interact in a manner that emphasizes a uniformity of attitudes,
values, and beliefs (Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002b). These families establish “clear rules
that are regularly enforced by parents who do not tolerate their children’s deviation from
family norms and expectations” (Ledbetter & Schrodt, 2008, p. 391). Families low in the
conformity orientation value the independence of family members and encourage more
heterogeneous beliefs and attitudes (Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002b). Family members are
able to produce individual thoughts and beliefs, children are involved in decision-making,
and it is acceptable for children to question or challenge family rules (Buckner et al.,
2013; Ledbetter & Schrodt, 2008).
The two orientations also reflect different underlying values that families hold.
Families high in the conversation orientation believe that the open and frequent exchange
of ideas is necessary for an enjoyable and rewarding family life. Further, parents see
regular discussions with their children as a primary avenue of educating and socializing
them (Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002b). Meanwhile, families low in the conversation
orientation do not find the frequent sharing of ideas to be essential to the functioning of
their family. Families high in the conformity orientation value their family relationships
over external ones, and they expect members to prioritize family time. They believe in a
more traditional family structure where families are “cohesive” and “hierarchical”
(Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002a, p. 86). In line with this belief, resources like living space

22
and money should be distributed equally among family members, and personal interests
and external relationships should be subordinated in order to capitalize on family time.
Children are expected to follow their parents’ commands, and they do not have much, if
any, say in family decisions (Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002b). Conversely, families low in
the conformity orientation do not believe in a rigid and hierarchically organized family.
They value independence and personal development among family members, which
causes them to encourage the pursuit of personal interests and meaningful relationships
outside of the family (Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002b). Overall, as previous scholars have
asserted, both the conversation and conformity orientations represent relational schemas
created through family members’ communication patterns. In turn, these repeated
experiences within the family context guide interactions among family members and
influences the ways in which they view the world (Graham et al., 2020; Hamon &
Schrodt, 2012; Horstman et al., 2018).
Family Communication Patterns and Political Consumerism
Parents can largely influence a child’s political learning prior to adulthood,
especially if parents are politically active and involve their children in political
discussions (Jennings et al., 2009). Importantly, political predispositions developed
during childhood endure over time, and they are much more stable than political positions
formed during adulthood (Jennings et al., 2009). The type of family communication
environment can enable or constrain one’s exposure to politics during childhood, which
can be linked to different political outcomes. For example, Hively and Eveland (2009)
found that students in high conformity families are less likely to discuss politics. Graham
et al. (2020) also found that laissez-faire families (i.e., low conversation, low conformity)

23
are the least likely to be politically active, while consensual families (i.e., high
conversation, high conformity) actively seek and share political information and
participate in politics regularly. By engaging in more unrestricted communication,
children may become more receptive to their parents’ viewpoints, which can result in
parents transmitting their political beliefs to their children (Shulman & DeAndrea, 2014).
Open and frequent parent-child conversations can also help foster basic skills for
effectively participating in challenging political conversations beyond the family setting
(Scruggs & Schrodt, 2021; Shah et al., 2009).
A small number of studies have looked at the effects of family communication on
political consumerism. Shah et al. (2007) found that news usage prompts political
consumerism indirectly through the dual influence of political talk, including
conversations with family, and environmental concerns. Baek (2010) also revealed that
political consumers are active information-seekers, and they will discuss political issues
with peers or family members. Although this finding indicates that political consumers
are more willing to engage in political talk, perhaps family political discussions serve as
an antecedent to political consumption. Looking specifically at the political socialization
of females, Gidengil et al. (2010) concluded that parents can influence their daughters’
participation in protest or market-oriented activities during adulthood. In the study, adult
women who had a politically active mother often followed in the mother’s footsteps,
leading Gidengil et al. (2010) to suggest that children with politically active parents
engage in an array of political activities as adults, such as boycotting or buycotting.
Although this study does not specifically address political discussions within the family,
being raised by parents who are immersed in the political sphere may spark a child’s

24
interest in politics and produce a desire to engage in various forms of political
participation.
Consistent with these findings, Wicks and Warren (2014) found that parents’
political consumption can lead to greater political consumption among their teens. Shared
political consumption between parents and their teens can also enhance teen political
consumption habits (Wicks & Warren, 2014). Adding to this, Wicks et al. (2014) found
that youth are more likely to engage in political consumerism when their parents are
political consumers. However, Wicks et al.’s (2014) study did not yield any significant
results regarding the effect of parental political discussions on youth political
consumption. These insignificant findings may be explained by the fact that dispositions
like political interest are still developing through childhood and adolescence (Neundorf et
al., 2013), meaning that the desire to boycott or buycott may not be fully present until
adulthood. Another reason for these findings may be that adolescents do not have the
financial means to purchase comparable, yet more expensive, products (Kam & Deichert,
2020).
More recently, Zorell and Denk (2021) found that political consumerism is
motivated and maintained by repeated attempts from others to influence individuals’
consumption. Although these efforts take place in both online and offline communication
contexts, Kelm and Dohle (2018) found that face-to-face communication remains more
influential on political consumerism activities, perhaps because these interactions carry
greater social pressure or there is greater trust in the information shared during an inperson discussion. Adding to this, Kam and Deichert (2020) asserted that social groups
can transform an individual’s expression of personal beliefs into an expression of
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collective identity, as well as amplify one’s perception that their action, along with the
actions of others, will make an impact. In line with this, Lindén (2005) found that friends
and family members can impact one’s food consumption choices, such as the decision to
become a vegetarian, through inspiring or pressuring them to alter their private food
strategies (Neilson & Paxton, 2010).
The family unit is an important social group that can disseminate information and
potentially inspire political consumption among its members. When deciding where to
purchase certain products, family members may discuss the implications of supporting
certain businesses, which may simulate intentional purchasing tendencies among
children. This may be the case given that buycotting often involves informal learning,
meaning that people learn about products or brands that are consistent, or inconsistent,
with their values through their friends, family members, and other social networks
(Copeland, 2014a). Additionally, the collective nature of boycotting may motivate family
members to encourage each other to engage in organized consumer action. The family is
a unique human system possessing value and belief systems that impact “how family
members perceive their social environment and their family’s place in it,” and
subsequently, their internal and external communication (Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002b,
p. 36). Political consumers view politics as extending beyond the political system to
include private attitudes, choices, and behaviors, and therefore, the family may be a
prime location for defining those values and attitudes that would prompt political
consumption.
Given that the family is a primary agent of political socialization, growing up in
an open communication environment may expose children to more political discussions
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and encourage the development of policy positions, which in turn, increases one’s
likelihood of engaging in political consumerism during adulthood. Although previous
research addresses family-based discussions to some extent, it is important to conduct a
more comprehensive examination regarding the characteristics of one’s family
communication and how that relates to specific modes of political consumption. The
present study aims to fill this gap by assessing the two orientations of family
communication patterns and how they relate to boycotting and buycotting.
Understanding the distinctions between boycotting and buycotting behaviors, the
effects of family communication patterns may vary for each form of political
consumption. Boycotts challenge companies by punishing them for objectionable labor
policies or practices, making them more conflict-oriented (Copeland, 2014a; Friedman,
1999). By nature, boycotting is more likely to involve explicit conflict between organized
groups and corporations and gain greater attention from the mass media (Copeland,
2014a). Meanwhile, buycotting is less visible, more individualistic, and characterized by
Friedman (1999) as more cooperation-oriented (Copeland, 2014a; Neilson, 2010).
Frequent family political discussions, even if they provoke disagreement, can enhance
children’s political knowledge and interest. Therefore, given the prominence of collective
consumer boycotts, children who grew up discussing politics may be more motivated to
take part in this organized form of political activity during adulthood, as they view it as a
viable means of influencing public policy. Buycotting, on the other hand, is less
pronounced and may be more of a private endeavor; one may engage in buycotting based
on their independent opinions formed through acquiring information and insights from a
variety of sources. Therefore, this study proposes the following hypotheses:
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H1a: Family political communication during childhood will be positively
associated with boycotting during adulthood.
H1b: Family political communication during childhood will be negatively
associated with buycotting during adulthood.
The Importance of Family Communication Patterns for Political Development
Political participation is a central feature of democracy that can be defined in
simple terms as “citizens’ affecting politics” (van Deth, 2016, p. 2). More forms of
political activity have become available, which van Deth (2016) attributes to the growing
influence of government and politics in everyday life, the overlap between private and
public spheres, and increased access to political information. Scholars have recognized
the expanding definition of political participation, which has led them to study distinct
forms of political engagement, such as online and offline participation (e.g., Jung et al.,
2011) or institutionalized and non-institutionalized participation (e.g., Hooghe & Marien,
2013). The present study differentiates online and offline political activity due to the
unique avenues of participation offered solely on digital platforms, as well as the
Internet’s ability to facilitate political participation by reducing the time and effort
required to perform various political activities (Jung et al., 2011). This distinction is also
important because online political participation can aid adolescents’ entry into the
political sphere and allow young adults to exercise greater influence in politics (Kim et
al., 2017).
It is important to consider the relationship between family communication and
adolescent political development, as the family is a key agent of political socialization.
Regarding political viewpoints, Ledbetter (2015) found that high conversation families
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(i.e., pluralistic and consensual) are more successful at transmitting political beliefs
between parents and children. Research has also shown that family political discussions,
which may be more frequent or robust among families high on the conversation
orientation, can elevate a children’s likelihood of participating in a variety of political
activities. For example, Graham et al. (2020) found that laissez-faire families (i.e., low
conversation, low conformity) are the least politically active, while consensual families
(i.e., high conversation, high conformity) actively seek and share political information
and participate in politics more frequently. Similarly, early research by Meadowcroft
(1986) suggested that growing up in a high conformity family hinders adolescents’
political development, while high conversation families are more likely to discuss politics
and cultivate greater political interest among adolescents. Liebes and Ribak (1992)
observed a similar trend within high conversation families, concluding that pluralistic
families (i.e., high conversation, low conformity) promote greater levels of political
participation. An individual’s family communication environment can further influence
one’s external political discussion networks. Somewhat contrary to previous findings,
Hively and Eveland (2009) found adolescent political discussions were more diverse
among families high on one orientation and low on another orientation (i.e., pluralistic
and protective). The findings were surprising, given the assumption that those raised in a
harmonious and conflict-averse environment would tend to gravitate toward similar,
homogeneous networks (Hively & Eveland, 2009).
Parents can also facilitate the interaction between children and media messages by
affecting their political news exposure, influencing their consumption habits, and
engaging them in news-related political discussions (Austin & Pinkleton, 2001). For
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example, parents can encourage youth news consumption habits and positively affect
their level of civic engagement through modeling news behaviors and engaging in family
discussions about news content (York & Scholl, 2015). Yet, it is essential to recognize
that adolescents are not “passively socialized” (Valenzuela et al., 2019, p. 1097).
Adolescents are active members of the socialization process, considering different
viewpoints and constructing their own political identity; as such, a “trickle-up” influence
from children to parents adds to the dynamic process of political socialization within the
family (McDevitt & Chaffee, 2002; York, 2019). For example, York (2019) found that
baseline levels of youth news consumption and political discussion with peers were
positively associated with future political discussion with parents. Therefore, it is
important to acknowledge that among the varying family communication environments,
families may engage in political discussions that are spurred primarily by parents,
primarily by children, or a mix of both. Nonetheless, as previous literature suggests, the
type of family communication climate one experiences during childhood influences one’s
degree of political activity during adulthood.
There are important differences between online and offline political activity that
cannot be overlooked. As Valenzuela et al. (2012) asserted, these forms of political
participation “share a foundation but are empirically different” (p. 17). Although offline
political activity is still a key element of civic engagement, political expression via digital
channels may appeal to younger generations in particular (Kim et al., 2017), as well as
individuals of all ages due to its ability to decrease the cost (i.e., time and physical
inconvenience) needed to take political action (Jung et al., 2011). By requiring less time
and effort to participate, online activities offer citizens more control over their
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engagement in politics (Jung et al., 2011). Another important difference is that online
political engagement and activity persists during and between elections, whereas
traditional methods of political participation are “punctuated and concentrated around
elections” (Feezell, 2016, p. 496). Yet, prior research has regarded participation as a
predominately offline occurrence, failing to consider how the Internet has created new
methods of political engagement (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2010). Recently, scholars have
called for distinct measures to separately evaluate offline and online political activity, as
it is necessary to further understand the Web’s effect on political activity and inequality
in participation (Vissers & Stolle, 2014).
The Internet and social media can enhance civic engagement, as it provides an
arena for people to express themselves and develop their own identities, as well as
connect with many social groups and individuals at once. Compared to in-person
conversations, online discussion networks can facilitate higher levels of political
engagement through expediting the spread of political messages (Valenzuela et al., 2012).
Additionally, Gil de Zúñiga et al. (2014b) found that social media usage can enhance
individuals’ political expression, which in turn, may increase their involvement in
political activities. As people consume content and interact with others online, they may
develop their “political self” and engage in political expression, which can cultivate
participation habits that lead to further political action (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2014b, p.
627; Jung et al., 2011). In line with this research, Kim and Chen (2016) found that the use
of blogs and social network sites were positively related to online political participation.
Valenzuela et al. (2012) also found that discussing politics with individuals outside of the
more tight-knit group of friends and family results in a higher degree of online political
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engagement. Ultimately, research points to the idea that external influences outside of the
family, especially political information and discussion networks accessed online, can
prompt more online political activity.
Meanwhile, past research has indicated a positive relationship between family
communication and more traditional means of political participation. For example, Liebes
and Ribak (1992) found that high conversation families encouraged greater levels of
political participation. Graham et al. (2020) also found that individuals from laissez-faire
homes are significantly less likely to participate in political activities compared to
consensual families. In their study, political participation was measured by asking
respondents about their involvement in more conventional forms of political activity,
such as voting, working for a political party, and displaying a political campaign button,
sticker, or sign. In general, offline political participation entails more tradition-based
political action, which may be promoted through discussions among family members,
especially as this information is passed down from older generations. Given that different
communication environments affect political development and political participation, this
study proposes the following hypotheses:
H2a: Family political communication during childhood will be positively
associated with offline political activity during adulthood.
H2b: Family political communication during childhood will be negatively
associated with online political activity during adulthood.
Political Consumerism: A Catalyst to Other Modes of Political Activity
Although it may seem that political consumers are detached from political
processes, research has shown that politically active individuals are more likely to engage
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in political consumerism compared to those who are less politically active (Echegaray,
2015; Stolle et al., 2005; Strømsnes, 2009). Those who engage in political consumerism
possess the same types of characteristics that have traditionally been attributed to
politically active individuals, which include being well-educated, having a left political
orientation, and displaying high levels of political interest (Endres & Panagopoulos,
2017; Strømsnes, 2009). Political consumerism is enhanced by a strong sense of citizen
duty and group membership, two factors that also augment institutionalized forms of
political activity (e.g., voting) (Newman & Bartels, 2011). Rather than an alternative
approach to politics, political consumerism can be regarded as an addition to
conventional forms of political participation (Echegaray, 2015; Strømsnes, 2009). It is an
individualistic form of political participation involving high initiative (Newman &
Bartels, 2011; Strømsnes, 2009).
According to Ward and de Vreese (2011), consumer and citizen arenas have
merged together, as specific purchasing behaviors can now be tied to political behavior.
Specifically, their research found that socially conscious consumption, defined as
considering the public consequences of one’s private consumption or using one’s
purchasing power to enact social change, has a positive effect on both online and offline
civic participation, but no significant effect on offline political participation. The positive
association between online and more civic forms of participation may be explained by the
shift away from traditional means to citizenship, such as voting, working for a political
party, or sending letters to government officials (Ward & de Vreese, 2011). These results
are consistent with findings from Stolle et al. (2005), who found that political
consumerism is practiced together with non-traditional and individualistic forms of
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political action, but it is not practiced consistently with conventional political acts. These
findings suggest that political consumers are more engaged in forms of political activity
that share common traits with political consumption.
Contrary to these findings, Gotlieb and Wells (2012) found that citizens who
made intentional purchasing decisions based on social or ethical considerations were
more likely to also participate in conventional political activities. However, for younger
people, understanding political consumption in a collective way was required for them to
also engage in other forms of political participation (Gotlieb & Wells, 2012). Interpreting
these results, Gotlieb and Wells (2012) posited that political consumerism can serve as a
gateway into larger collective political activity for younger individuals who have less
experience in civic engagement. Another possible explanation for why political
consumption is often tied to other forms of political activity comes from Stolle et al.
(2005), who asserted that citizens who actively practice political consumerism believe
that it is less effective at bringing about political and social change than other types of
political action, such as voting and volunteering. Due to these pessimistic attitudes,
political consumers may feel compelled to exercise additional means of political action to
effectively advocate for desired change.
Political consumers show great political interest, and they are willing to take part
in a time-consuming process that involves learning about company practices and
deliberately seeking out alternative products or brands that align with their values
(Copeland, 2014b). Given the individualized and self-motived nature of political
consumerism, individuals who use their purchasing power to send political messages may
be inclined to engage in other forms of political participation. As Copeland (2014a)
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posited, different citizenship norms, which guide people’s perceptions of what it means to
be a good citizen, underlie both forms of political consumption; whereas boycotting is
associated with dutiful citizenship norms, buycotting is tied to engaged citizenship
norms. Citizens who stress dutiful norms are more likely to participate in conventional
political activities, such as voting in elections and working for political parties.
Conversely, people who stress engaged norms are more likely to be involved in “extrainstitutional activities,” such as collaborating with others to fix social problems
(Copeland, 2014a, p. 176). Seeing that the different citizenship norms underpinning each
form of political consumption are associated with distinct political participation
outcomes, boycotters and buycotters will likely differ in their choices regarding other
modes of political activity:
H3a: Boycotting will be positively associated with offline political activity, but
negatively associated with online political activity.
H3b: Buycotting will be positively associated with online political activity, but
negatively associated with offline political activity.
Due to the link between political consumerism and political activity, and the effect of
family communication on political activity, this study also asks the following research
question:
RQ1: To what extent does political consumerism mediate the effect of family
political communication on political activity?
The Effects of Political Trust and Demographic Factors on Political Consumerism
and Political Activity
Political trust carries important implications for a variety of political behaviors.
For example, if political trust is low leading up to an election, support may decline for the
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party that has held more control in recent governments, and voters may choose to vote for
new challengers or abstain altogether (Petrarca et al., 2020). However, the effect of
political trust on political participation has continued to raise conflicting findings, with
some scholars claiming that political trust is a prerequisite to civic engagement, while
others argue that mistrust can fuel greater levels of civic participation (Hooghe & Marien,
2013).
The level of political trust possessed by an individual may encourage them to
engage in specific types of political activity. Hooghe and Marien (2013) found that
citizens with high levels of political trust are more likely to engage in institutionalized
forms of political participation (e.g., voting, contacting government officials), but less
likely to participate in non-institutionalized forms (e.g., boycotting products, taking part
in a demonstration). In other words, those who distrust the political system are more
likely to engage in non-traditional modes of participation, finding that they can
effectively challenge and put pressure on policymakers by targeting other actors outside
the government. For example, in the Latin American context, political consumerism is
seen as a viable political tool because citizens perceive corporations as being more
reliable than governments when it comes to handling public demands and following
through on their obligation to deliver public goods (Echegaray, 2015). These findings
imply that low levels of political trust do not necessarily lead citizens to feel apathetic nor
distance themselves from the political system; rather, as Hooghe and Marien (2013)
articulate, reduced levels of political trust “indicate a structural trend towards different
forms of interaction between citizens and the political system” (p. 13). Based on these
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observations, political distrust may mobilize citizens to participate in acts of political
consumerism.
Previous research has examined the effects of trust on political consumerism,
revealing inconsistent results. While past research has found that political consumerism is
intensified by political distrust (e.g., Newman & Bartels, 2011), other scholars have
concluded that political consumers are not any more distrustful toward political
institutions than those who do not engage in political consumerism (e.g., Strømsnes,
2009). Stolle et al. (2005) found that those who practice political consumerism do not
expect national institutions to solve their problems, but they are more inclined to believe
in the power of individualized actions to remedy political gripes than those who do not
engage in political consumerism. Similarly, Berlin (2011) asserted that when it comes to
sustainable development, political consumers may trust some political institutions, but
overall, they are critical of the political establishment, and they do not depend completely
on the establishment to solve issues of sustainability. Despite having critical and
mistrusting attitudes toward political institutions, political consumers often possess strong
feelings of internal political efficacy, meaning that they feel like they have the
competence and ability to participate in politics (Stolle et al., 2005). Therefore, distrust in
the political system does not automatically hinder political consumers’ ability or
willingness to take political action and attempt to influence the system. Adding to the
complexity of the relationship between political trust and political consumerism, Neilson
(2010) found that those who are more trusting of institutions are more likely to engage in
buycotting, while those who distrust institutions are more likely to boycott. If people
perceive institutions as trustworthy and acting in the citizens’ best interest, they may be
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more inclined to buycott because it is seen as a more positive behavior. Conversely, those
who lack trust in institutions may be more willing to punish a business by withholding
support from them (Neilson, 2010).
Demographic variables and political ideology have also been shown to affect
political consumerism and political activity. While some studies have concluded that
women are more likely to participate in political consumerism (e.g., Stolle et al., 2005),
others have found no significant effects of gender on political consumerism (e.g., Baek,
2010). Meanwhile, men have traditionally been found to be more politically active, which
Verba et al. (1997) attributed to the fact that men are typically more politically informed,
interested, and efficacious. Previous research has also indicated that individuals with a
higher level of education (e.g., Newman & Bartels, 2011; Strømsnes, 2009) and a higher
income (e.g., Sandovici & Davis, 2010) are more likely to engage in political
consumerism. This may be the case given that well-educated individuals have greater
access to political information, as well as product information, and individuals with
higher incomes have the resources to engage in the deliberate purchasing of products
(Sandovici & Davis, 2010). In line with these findings, income has been found to
positively affect both conventional and unconventional political activity (Cicatiello et al.,
2015), and education has been found to boost political activity (Verba et al., 1995).
Finally, partisan identity and political ideology have been found to play a key role in
predicting political activity. For example, political consumerism has been associated with
a liberal ideology and identification with the Democratic Party (Copeland & Boulianne,
2020; Strømsnes, 2009). Ideological strength, whether that be liberal or conservative, has
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also been positively related to political consumerism and political activity (Endres &
Panagopoulos, 2017; Pan et al., 2006).
Overall, it appears that political trust plays an important role in motivating civic
engagement, and more specifically, political consumerism. Given the polarizing nature of
contemporary U.S. politics and the important implications trust has for political
participation, it is important to examine the impact of political trust on political
consumerism and political activity. Moreover, demographic variables, partisan identity,
and ideological strength have been shown to influence political consumerism and
political activity. Therefore, this study proposes the following research question:
RQ2: To what extent does political trust, partisan identity, political ideology, and
demographic factors (gender, education, and income) affect political consumerism
and political activity?
Based on prior literature, the study proposes the following model (Figure 1):

Figure 1. Theoretical model of independent variables, mediators, and dependent
variables.
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METHODOLOGY

Participants
The total sample consisted of 523 U.S. adults (N = 523) recruited by Qualtrics.
Quota sampling was used due to its ability to select subjects based on a predetermined or
known percentage (Wimmer & Dominick, 2013). Respondents in the present study were
recruited based on the U.S. representative quotas on region and gender1. The participants
varied in age, ranging from 18 to 87 years (M = 47.7, SD = 18.3). Regarding gender,
50.5% of the participants were women (n = 264) and 49.5% were men (n = 259). Among
the participants, 78% were White (n = 408), 10.7% were Black (n = 56), 5.4% were
Latino (n = 28), 4.2% were Asian (n = 22), and 1.9% were other races (e.g., Native
American) (n = 10). The respondents varied in their education level, as 27.8% of
participants held a high school diploma or less (n = 146), 33.9% had an associate’s
degree or some college education (n = 177), and 38.2% had a bachelor’s degree or higher
(n = 200). Political ideology was also mixed; 32.1% considered themselves conservative
or very conservative (n = 168), 41.3% moderate or centrist (n = 216), and 26.6% liberal
or very liberal (n = 139). Regarding participants’ total family income in the past year,
54.7% (n = 286) had a household income less than $50,000, while the remaining 45.3%
(n = 237) had a family income greater than $50,000 (See Table 1).

1

According to 2019 U.S. Census Data, females comprised 50.8% of the population and males made up
49.2% of the population. Among the participants in this study, 50.5% were women and 49.5% were men.
The Census also showed that 17.1% of the population resides in the Northeast, 20.8% in the Midwest,
23.9% in the West, and 38.3% in the South. The sample was representative of this, with 17.2% of
participants residing in the Northeast, 20.3% in the Midwest, 22.9% in the West, and 39.6% in the South.
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Table 1. Sample Descriptive Statistics (N = 523)
Variables
Age
(M = 47.7,
SD = 18.3)

Gender

Race

Income

Education

Partisan
Identity

n

%

18-25
26-35
36-45
46-55
65+

73
92
90
89
179

14.0%
17.6%
17.2%
17.0%
34.2%

Female
Male

264
259

50.5%
49.5%

White
Black or African American
Hispanic/Latino
Asian or Asian-American
Other races (e.g., Native American)

408
56
22
28
10

78.0%
10.7%
5.4%
4.2%
1.9%

Less than $10,000
10 to under $20,000
20 to under $30,000
30 to under $40,000
40 to under $50,000
50 to under $75,000
75 to under $100,000
100 to under $150,000
$150,000 or more

60
55
79
52
40
89
75
48
25

11.5%
10.5%
15.1%
9.9%
7.6%
17.0%
14.3%
9.2%
4.8%

High school degree or less
Two-year associate degree or some college
Bachelor’s degree
Post-graduate degree or less

146
177
111
89

27.9%
33.8%
21.2%
17.0%

Democrat/Lean Democrat
Republican/Lean Republican
Independent
Other

200
141
162
20

38.2%
27.0%
31.0%
3.8%
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Table 1 (continued).
Variables

Political
Ideology

Region

Employment

n

%

Very conservative
Conservative
Moderate/centrist
Liberal
Very liberal

69
99
216
84
55

13.2%
18.9%
41.3%
16.1%
10.5%

Northeast
Midwest
South
West

90
106
207
120

17.2%
20.3%
39.6%
22.9%

Full-time
Part-time
Not employed

169
75
279

32.3%
14.3%
53.3%

Procedure
For this study, an online survey was conducted, and the results were used for data
analysis. Survey research was chosen for to its ability to collect large amounts of data
from a variety of people in different geographical locations. Surveys also allow
researchers to examine a range of variables (e.g., demographic and attitudes, beliefs,
behaviors, etc.) and apply various statistical analyses (Wimmer & Dominick, 2013). The
survey was administered to U.S. adults in July of 2021. Participants were recruited
through a Qualtrics panel, and the survey was administered via Qualtrics. Qualtrics is an
online service that works with researchers’ needs to create a panel of participants based
on key factors including sample size, target demographics, survey complexity, and length
of survey (Brandon et al., 2014). Qualtrics was utilized for data collection due to its
ability to recruit a representative sample. Compared to other web-based survey tools (e.g.,
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M-Turk), Qualtrics has been found to be the most demographically and politically
representative in the U.S. (Boas et al., 2018). Furthermore, Qualtrics’ large participant
pool, its ability to obtain participants that match researchers’ needs, and the use of
demographic screens allows researchers to acquire “focused and externally valid
samples” (Brandon et al., 2014, p. 11).
Prior to the survey, participants reviewed and completed an informed consent
form with an overview of the study approved by the Institutional Review Board (#HR3878) at a university in the Midwest United States. After obtaining their voluntary
consent, participants were asked to provide their answers related to the main variables of
family communication, political consumerism, political activity, and political trust. Other
questions regarding demographic information (e.g., education, gender, and income),
partisan identity, and political ideology were included in the questionnaire. The
participants received $4.51 as compensation for participating in the study.
Two pre-tests of the survey were conducted with 100 participants (N = 100) to
ensure that the survey was working properly and contained clear instructions and
questions. One pre-test was administered via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (M-Turk), an
online platform that collects data quickly and provides researchers with respondents who
are demographically more diverse than traditional student samples. Several studies have
shown that M-Turk samples are reasonably congruent with other samples and responses
to established surveys (Sheehan, 2018). The pre-test specifically measured whether the
survey items were clear, understandable, easy to answer, and relevant (e.g., “After
answering all questions, I found them: unclear/clear”). A five-point differential scale was
used for each item. For clarity, the scale ranged from 1 (“Unclear”) to 5 (“Clear”). The
scale for understandability ranged from 1 (“Confusing”) to 5 (“Understandable”). For
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ease, the scale ranged from 1 (“Hard to answer”) to 5 (“Easy to answer”). Finally,
relevance was measured on a scale from 1 (“Irrelevant”) to 5 (“Relevant”). Overall, the
pre-test confirmed that the questions were clear (M = 4.44, SD = 0.79), understandable
(M = 4.32, SD = 0.90), easy to answer (M = 4.44, SD = 0.71), and relevant (M = 4.42,
SD = 0.73). The same questions were asked in the survey administered via Qualtrics. The
results of the Qualtrics pre-test showed that the questions were clear (M = 4.10, SD =
1.15), understandable (M = 3.68, SD = 1.35), easy to answer (M = 3.65, SD = 1.24), and
relevant (M = 3.71, SD = 1.28).
The MTurk pre-test was also used to determine the median amount of time it took
to complete the survey, which was 10 minutes. Based on the median duration of the
survey in the pre-test, responses that were completed in under five minutes and greater
than 30 minutes were automatically eliminated by the Qualtrics system in the main test.
According to Sheehan (2018), data quality can benefit from limiting the amount of time a
respondent has to complete a survey. Therefore, a minimum time was established to
ensure that respondents provided thoughtful responses, which would be difficult to do in
under half the median time. Further, respondents were given three times the median
length to complete the survey, since it allows for variation among the respondents, yet
ensures that they complete the survey in one sitting (Sheehan, 2018).
At the beginning of the survey, participants were asked if they intended to
provide their best answer for each question; if they did not agree to provide their best
answers, Qualtrics screened out the participant, preventing them from taking the rest of
the survey. To further ensure data quality, an attention-check question was placed in the
middle of the survey (i.e., “This is to check your attention for this survey. Please check
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‘strongly disagree’ (1)”). All participants provided the correct answer for the attention
check (100%).
Measurements
Family Communication Patterns
To measure family communication patterns within the home, this study employed
the Revised Family Communication Pattern (RFCP) scale (Graham et al., 2020; Koerner
& Fitzpatrick, 2002b). According to Koerner and Fitzpatrick (2002b), interactions within
the family shape family relationship schemas, which in turn, determines how one
perceives their familial relationships and how one behaves in the family context. The
RFCP does not require participants to recall the specific language used in conversations
with parents; rather participants are asked to consider the broader family communication
environment they experienced during childhood. The questionnaire contained 15
statements measuring the conversation orientation (e.g., “My parents encouraged me to
challenge their ideas and beliefs”; Cronbach’s α = .958, M = 2.87, SD = 1.12) and 11
statements measuring the conformity orientation (e.g., “In our home, my parents usually
had the last word”; Cronbach’s α = .902, M = 3.34, SD = 0.93) (See Table 2).
Respondents were instructed to indicate their level of agreement with the statements on a
5-point scale ranging from 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 5 (“Strongly agree”).

Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Family Communication Items (CVO) and
(CFO)
Mean
Family Communication Items
(SD)
Conversation Orientation (CVO)
CVO1: In our family we often talked about topics like politics and religion
where some people disagree with others.

2.67
(1.42)
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Table 2 (continued).
Family Communication Items

Mean
(SD)

CVO2: My parents often said something like "Every member of the family
should have some say in family decisions."

2.57
(1.32)

CVO3: My parents often asked my opinion when the family is talking
about something.

2.65
(1.39)

CVO4: My parents encouraged me to challenge their ideas and beliefs.

2.54
(1.41)
3.07
(1.44)

CVO5: My parents often said something like "You should always look at
both sides of an issue."
CVO6: I usually told my parents what I am thinking about things.
CVO7: I could tell my parents almost anything.
CVO8: In our family we often talked about our feelings and emotions.
CVO9: My parents and I often had long, relaxed conversations about
nothing in particular.
CVO10: I really enjoyed talking with my parents, even when we disagreed.
CVO11: My parents liked to hear my opinions, even when they didn't
agree with me.
CVO12: My parents encouraged me to express my feelings.

3.05
(1.38)
3.02
(1.45)
2.67
(1.42)
2.89
(1.43)
3.11
(1.41)
2.95
(1.37)

CVO14: We often talked as a family about things we had done during the
day.

3.01
(1.43)
2.76
(1.42)
3.07
(1.38)

CVO15: In our family we often talked about our plans and hopes for the
future.

3.07
(1.39)

Conformity Orientation (CFO)
CFO1: My parents often said something like “You’ll know better when
you grow up.

3.53
(1.29)

CFO2: My parents often said something like "My ideas are right and you
should not question them."

2.80
(1.40)

CVO13: My parents tended to be very open about their emotions.
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Table 2 (continued).
Family Communication Items

Mean
(SD)

CFO3: My parents often said something like "A child should not argue
with adults."

3.28
(1.45)

CFO4: My parents often said something like "You should give in on
arguments rather than risk making people mad."

2.51
(1.33)

CFO5: My parents often said something like "There are some things that
just shouldn't be talked about."

3.20
(1.41)

CFO6: When anything really important was involved, my parents expected
me to obey without question.

3.71
(1.23)

CFO7: In our home, my parents usually had the last word.

CFO9: My parents sometimes became irritated with my views if they were
different from theirs.

4.00
(1.15)
3.48
(1.28)
3.11
(1.32)

CFO10: If my parents didn't approve of it, they didn't want to know about
it.

3.05
(1.32)

CFO11: When I was at home, I was expected to obey my parents' rules.

4.05
(1.15)

CFO8: My parents felt that it is important to be the boss.

Political Consumerism
This study measured political consumerism using seven items borrowed from
Newman and Bartels (2011) and Baek (2010). Participants were asked if they had ever
engaged in boycotting (e.g., “Not bought something because of conditions under which
the product is made, or because you dislike the conduct of the company that produces it”;
Cronbach’s α = .795, M = 1.88, SD =1.56) and buycotting (e.g., “Bought a certain
product or service because you like the social or political values of the company that
produces or provides it”; Cronbach’s α = .841, M = 1.35, SD = 1.30) (See Table 3). The
measure of political consumerism was a dichotomous variable coded “1” if the
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respondent had participated in at least one form of political consumerism (i.e., boycotting
or buycotting), and “0” if they had never participated in either form (Newman & Bartels,
2011). Rather than measure political consumerism as a single variable, it was divided into
boycotting and buycotting. All the items for boycotting were combined, and the
frequency of engaging in boycotting was indicated from “0” (never participated in any
form of boycotting) to “4” (participated in all forms of boycotting). Similarly, all the
items for buycotting were combined, and the frequency of engaging in buycotting was
indicated from “0” (never participated in any form of buycotting) to “3” (participated in
all forms of buycotting).

Table 3. Political Consumerism (CONSM) Items
Political Consumerism Items

%
(Yes/No)

CONSM1: Decided not to buy something from a certain company
because you disagree with the social, environmental, worker, or
political policies of the company that distributes the item.

Y – 52.8%
N – 47.2%

CONSM2: Not bought something because of conditions under which
the product is made, or because you dislike the conduct of the
company that produces it.

Y – 53.2%
N – 46.8%

CONSM3: Participated in a boycott (certain products or stores).

Y – 37.7%
N – 62.3%

CONSM4: Avoided buying something in order to register a protest or
send a message.

Y – 44.0%
N – 56.0%

CONSM5: Engaged in "buycotting," that is buying a certain product
or service because you like the social or political values of the
company that produces or sells the product.

Y – 42.3%
N – 57.7%

CONSM6: Bought something from a certain company because you
agreed with the social, environmental, worker or political policies of
the company that distributes the item.

Y – 44.4%
N – 55.6%
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Table 3 (continued).
Political Consumerism Items

%
(Yes/No)

CONSM7: Bought a certain product or service because you like the
social or political values of the company that produces or provides it.

Y – 48.4%
N – 51.6%

Political Activity
Adopting Jung et al.’s (2011) scale, political activity was divided into two
categories for measurement: offline and online political activity. Respondents were
instructed to recall their political activity during the 2020 election year. Offline political
participation was measured with 12 items, including whether respondents “voted in the
2020 election,” “spoke with public officials in person,” or “worked for a political party or
candidate” (Cronbach’s α = .854, M = 3.45, SD = 3.01). Online political activity was
measured by six items, which asked participants if, during the 2020 election cycle, they
participated in activities such as “sending e-mails to politicians” or “visiting a campaign
or candidate advocacy website” (Cronbach’s α = .811, M = 1.61, SD = 1.90). Given that
Jung et al. (2011) applied their study to the 2008 election, some of the items were
updated to reflect today’s digital environment. For example, respondents answered
whether they “used a social media platform to encourage others to take action on political
issues,” or “used hashtags related to a political/social cause” during the 2020 election
year (See Table 4). The measure of political activity was a dichotomous variable coded
“1” if the respondent had participated in that activity, and “0” if they did not participate
in that activity. All the items for offline political activity were combined, and the
frequency of these actions was indicated from “0” (did not participate in any form of
offline political activity) to “12” (participated in all forms of offline political activity). All
the items for online political activity were also combined, with the frequency being
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indicated from “0” (never participated in any form of online political activity) to “6”
(participated in all forms of online political activity).

Table 4. Political Activity Items (OFA) and (ONA)
Political Activity Items
Offline Political Activity Items (OFA)
OFA1: Voted in the 2020 election

%
(Yes/No)
Y – 75.5%
N – 24.5%

OFA2: Spoke with public officials in person.

Y – 17.4%
N – 82.6%

OFA3: Contacted (e.g., called, sent a letter) a public official at any
level of government.

Y – 29.6%
N – 70.4%

OFA4: Participated in a demonstration or protest for a political cause.

Y – 16.1%
N – 83.9%

OFA5: Attended a political meeting, rally, or speech.

Y – 19.5%
N – 80.5%

OFA6: Contacted the media to express your opinion on a political
issue.

Y – 15.9%
N – 84.1%

OFA7: Encouraged someone to vote.

Y – 69.2%
N – 30.8%

OFA8: Wore a campaign button or article of clothing (e.g., hat, t-shirt).

Y – 29.6%
N – 70.4%

OFA9: Displayed a campaign bumper sticker or yard sign.

Y – 27.5%
N – 72.5%

OFA10: Worked for a political party or candidate.

Y – 10.7%
N – 89.3%

OFA11: Was involved in political action groups, party committees, or
political clubs.

Y – 14.3%
N – 85.7%

OFA12: Participated in any local political actions.

Y – 19.3%
N – 80.7%
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Table 4 (continued).
Political Activity Items
Online Political Activity Items (ONA)
ONA1: Sent e-mails to politicians.

%
(Yes/No)
Y – 28.9%
N – 71.1%

ONA2: Visited a campaign or candidate advocacy Web site.

Y – 31.9%
N – 68.1%

ONA3: Made contributions to a political campaign online.

Y – 23.3%
N – 76.7%

ONA4: Used a social media platform to encourage others to take action
on political issues.

Y – 32.3%
N – 67.7%

ONA5: Changed profile picture on social media to show support for a
political/social cause.

Y – 22.8%
N – 77.2%

ONA6: Used hashtags related to a political/social cause.

Y – 21.6%
N – 78.4%

Political Trust
This study adopted the items proposed by Craig et al. (1990), which measure the
level of trust toward both regime and incumbent authorities. This instrument contains
nine incumbent-based trust items intended to evaluate the perceived honesty, fairness,
and competence of government officials and elected leaders (e.g., “Most government
officials try to serve the public interest, even if it is against their personal interests”). Four
regime-based trust items were included as well to assess the respondents’ perceptions and
feelings of loyalty to the political system (e.g., “Whatever its faults may be, the American
form of government is still the best for us”) (See Table 5). Participants were instructed to
indicate their level of agreement with the statements on a 5-point scale ranging from 1
(“Strongly disagree”) to 5 (“Strongly agree”); (Cronbach’s α = .730, M = 2.75, SD =
0.62).
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Table 5. Means and Standard Deviations (SD) of Political Trust (PT) Items
Political Trust Items

Mean
(SD)

PT1: You can generally trust the people who run our government to do
what is right.

2.64
(1.25)

PT2: It often seems like our government is run by a few big interests
looking out for themselves rather than being run for the benefit of all the
people.

3.93
(1.05)

PT3: Most government officials try to serve the public interest, even if it is
against their personal interests.

2.68
(1.22)

PT4: When government leaders make statements to the American people
(e.g., on television), they are usually telling the truth.

2.66
(1.15)

PT5: Unless we keep a close watch on them, many of our elected leaders
will look out for special interests rather than for all the people.

3.98
(1.03)

PT6: Those we elected to public office usually try to keep the promises
they made during the election.

2.86
(1.18)

PT7: Most of the people running our government are well-qualified to
handle the problems that we are facing in this country.

2.90
(1.20)

PT8: Most public officials can be trusted to do what is right without having
to constantly check on them.

2.62
(1.21)

PT9: Quite a few government leaders are not as honest as the voters have a
right to expect.

3.94
(1.05)

PT10: Whatever its faults may be, the American form of government is
still the best for us.

3.68
(1.17)

PT11: It may be necessary to make some major changes in our form of
government in order to solve the problems facing our country.

3.53
(1.24)

PT12: I would rather live under our system of government than any other
that I can think of.

3.83
(1.27)

PT13: There is not much about our form of government to be proud of.

2.73
(1.27)

Control Variables
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This study included participants’ demographic information (i.e., gender, income,
and education), partisan identity, and political ideology as control variables in the
analysis. Previous research has indicated that women are more inclined than men to
participate in political consumerism (e.g., Sandovici & Davis, 2010; Stolle et al., 2005).
However, some studies have found that gender does not significantly influence political
consumerism (Baek, 2010), while others have found that women are more prone to
specific political consumption behaviors (i.e., buycott) (Neilson, 2010). Further, scholars
have revealed that younger individuals (e.g., Newman & Bartels, 2011; Sandovici &
Davis, 2010) and those with higher levels of education (e.g., Newman & Bartels, 2011;
Strømsnes, 2009) are more likely to be political consumers. However, Baek (2010) found
that less educated and lower-income consumers are more likely to buycott, while more
educated and higher-income consumers tend to boycott because they have access to the
necessary resources to find alternative products or brands. Lastly, individuals with a
liberal ideology, as well as Democrats, have been shown to display greater levels of
political consumerism (Endres & Panagopoulos, 2017; Strømsnes, 2009). Scholars have
also determined that individuals at the ends of the ideological spectrum are more likely to
participate in boycotts and buycotts than those who identify as moderate (Copeland,
2014b). Meanwhile, Baek (2010) found that Republicans and conservatives prefer
buycotting while Democrats and liberals engage more in boycotting. The differences
observed among boycotters and buycotters suggest that different types of political
consumption are linked to different demographic characteristics and political orientations.
Overall, the mixed findings regarding the effects of gender, education, income, partisan
identity, and political ideology on political consumerism warrant further investigation.
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Analysis
Following data collection, multiple regression analysis was employed using
STATA 17 to analyze the relationship between the independent variables (i.e., family
communication and control variables) and each dependent variable (i.e., boycotting,
buycotting, offline political activity, online political activity). Four separate regressions
were run to analyze the effects of the conversation and conformity orientation, and the
control variables, on each dependent variable. Another two regressions were conducted to
examine the effects of boycotting and buycotting on both forms of political activity.
Following this, an additional two regressions were run to include all the variables,
meaning that offline political activity and online political activity were the dependent
variables. For offline political activity, the results showed significant effects for the
conversation and conformity orientation, boycotting and buycotting, gender, other
political parties, and political trust. For online political activity, the results showed
significant effects for the conversation and conformity orientation, as well as for
boycotting and buycotting. The results from these two regressions were used determine
which variables to include in the subsequent model for path analysis. Path analysis aims
to determine the strength of the paths within the model, which are representative of the
different relationships among the model’s constructs (Hair et al., 2010; Kline, 2011).
Therefore, to further analyze the data, path analysis was run using AMOS 25 to test the
proposed structural model and to evaluate the mediation effect of political consumerism.
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RESULTS

Testing Hypotheses: Multiple Regression Analysis
For hypothesis testing, a series of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
analyses were conducted using STATA 17 statistical software program. Multiple
regression was used in the analysis to assess how the independent variables (conversation
and conformity orientations) and control variables, including political trust, political
ideology, and demographic factors (gender, education, income, and political party)
influence dependent variables (boycotting/buycotting and online/offline political
activity). To ensure accurate hypothesis testing via multiple regression analysis, the
degrees of multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity were assessed.
Multicollinearity causes “shared” variance among independent variables, which
reduces the ability to predict dependent measures and makes the effect of each
independent variable less distinguishable (Hair et al., 2010, p. 201). Multicollinearity can
be measured by tolerance, which is “the amount of variability of the selected independent
variable not explained by the other independent variables” (Hair et al., 2010, p. 201).
Another measure of multicollinearity is the variance inflation factor (VIF), which shows
the effect that the other independent variables have on the standard error of a regression
coefficient. The VIF is the inverse of the tolerance value; smaller tolerance values and
larger VIF values signal issues with collinearity. In general, the degree of collinearity is
considered acceptable if the tolerance value is greater than 0.10 and the VIF is less than
10 (Hair et al., 2010). According to the VIF and tolerance tests, the present study showed
no violation of multicollinearity in all independent variables.
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One of the most common assumption violations in multiple regression analysis is
heteroskedasticity, or “the presence of unequal variances” (Hair et al., 2010, p. 185). In
statistical tests applying multiple regression, it is “assumed that the residuals are normally
distributed and have uniform variances across all levels of the predicters” resulting in
homoscedasticity (Kline, 2011, p. 23). However, heteroskedasticity may arise if there are
outliers, extreme non-normality in the observed scores, or more measurement error
within the criterion or predictors (Kline, 2011). To assess heteroskedasticity, the present
study conducted the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test. For the test evaluating the
relationship between family communication and political activity (i.e., H2), there was
heteroskedasticity as the fitted values of offline political activity, χ2(1) = 25.54, p <
0.001, and online political activity, χ2(1) = 12.91, p < 0.001, were smaller than 0.05.
Additionally, when testing the relationship between political consumerism and political
activity (i.e., H3), heteroskedasticity was present as the fitted values of offline political
activity, χ2 (1) = 74.08, p < 0.001, and online political activity, χ2 (1) = 76.16, p < 0.001,
were smaller than 0.05. As a result, White’s heteroskedastic robust standard error was run
as a remedial measure, and this study reports these results (i.e., changed standard errors
and tests of statistical significance).
For H1–H3, political trust, political ideology, political party, and demographic
factors (gender, education, and income) were added into the regression models. The
variables gender and political party were recoded as dichotomous variables. To control
for gender, the variable labeled “Female” was created, coded “1” for female and “0” for
male. For political party, a recoded variable labeled “Republican” was created where
Republican was recoded as “1” and Democrat, independent, and other political parties
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were all recoded as “0.” An “other parties” variable was also created by recoding
independent and other party as “1” and Democrat and Republican as “0.” Together, all
independent (conformity and conversation dimensions of family communication) and
control variables in the model accounted for a significant portion of the variance in
boycotting behaviors, R2 = 0.13, F(9, 513) = 8.26, p < 0.001 and buycotting behaviors, R2
= 0.14, F(9, 513) = 9.42, p < 0.001. H1a proposed that family political communication
during childhood will be positively associated boycotting during adulthood, while H1b
proposed that family political communication during childhood will be negatively
associated buycotting during adulthood. As expected, family political discussions during
childhood appeared as a strong predictor of boycotting. However, family communication
also positively predicted buycotting, which was not anticipated. The results indicated that
one unit change in the conversation orientation results in an increase of 0.20 in
boycotting behaviors (b = 0.20, t = 3.35) and an increase of 0.25 in buycotting behaviors
(b = 0.25, t = 4.91), controlling for effects of other independent variables in the model.
Similarly, the results showed that one unit change in the conformity orientation results in
an increase of 0.27 in boycotting behaviors (b = 0.27, t = 3.80) and an increase of 0.28 in
buycotting behaviors (b = 0.28, t = 4.66), controlling for effects of other independent
variables in the model (See Table 6-1).
The two orientations of family communication and the control variables in the
model also accounted for a significant portion of the variance in offline political activity,
R2 = 0.25, F(9, 513) = 16.13, p < 0.001 and online political activity, R2 = 0.18, F(9, 513)
= 12.35, p < 0.001. H2a proposed that family political communication during childhood
will be positively associated with offline political activity during adulthood, and H2b
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posited that family political communication during childhood will be negatively
associated with online political activity during adulthood. H1a was supported, as family
political discussions during childhood appeared as a strong predictor of offline political
activity. However, contrary to expectations in H2b, family political communication
appeared to positively predict online political activity, as well. The results indicated that
one unit change in the conversation orientation results in an increase of 0.72 in offline
political activity (b = 0.72, t = 6.57) and an increase of 0.40 in online political activity (b
= 0.40, t = 5.35), controlling for effects of other independent variables in the model. The
results further showed that one unit change in the conformity orientation results in an
increase of 0.67 in offline political activity (b = 0.67, t = 4.95) and an increase of 0.40 in
online political activity (b = 0.40, t = 4.82), controlling for effects of other independent
variables in the model (See Table 6-2).
Furthermore, both forms of political consumerism and control variables in the
model accounted for a significant portion of the variance in offline political activity, R2 =
0.32, F(9, 513) = 24.82, p < 0.001 and online political activity, R2 = 0.32, F(9, 513) =
25.64, p < 0.001. H3a proposed that boycotting will be positively associated with offline
political activity, but negatively associated with online political activity. Meanwhile, H3b
proposed that buycotting will be positively associated with online political activity, but
negatively associated with offline political activity. However, the analysis revealed that
both forms of political consumption were strong predictors of both offline and online
political activity. The results showed that one unit change in boycotting behaviors results
in an increase of 0.52 in offline political activity (b = 0.52, t = 5.21) and an increase of
0.51 in online political activity (b = 0.51, t = 4.52), controlling for effects of other
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independent variables in the model. The results further showed that one unit change in
buycotting behaviors results in an increase of 0.32 in offline political activity (b = 0.32, t
= 5.25) and an increase of 0.43 in online political activity (b = 0.43, t = 5.76), controlling
for effects of other independent variables in the model (See Table 7).
Regarding RQ2, those with lower levels of political trust were more likely to
engage in boycotting behaviors (b = –0.47, t = –4.25). Among the demographic variables,
other political parties were a negative predictor for boycotting (b = –0.35, t = –2.10),
offline political activity (b = –1.05, t = –3.59), and online political activity (b = –0.47, t =
–2.48). Income was a positive predictor for offline political activity (b = 0.13, t = 2.18),
while gender was negatively associated with offline political activity (b = –0.55, t = –
2.34). Lastly, education was positively associated with online political activity (b = 0.10,
t = 1.98), controlling for the effects of other independent variables in the model (See
Tables 6-1 and 6-2).
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Table 6-1. OLS regression analyses for the relationship between family communication
and political consumerism.
Boycotting (BOY)
Buycotting (BUY)
Variables
b
t
b
t
Conversation
0.20**
3.35
0.25***
4.91
Conformity
0.27***
3.80
0.28***
4.66
Education
0.06
1.32
0.05
1.38
Income
0.05
1.65
0.03
1.23
Political Ideology
0.09
1.35
0.07
1.17
Female
–0.19
–1.40
0.00
0.01
Republican
–0.34
–1.73
–0.30
–1.84
Other Parties
–0.35*
–2.10
–0.23
–1.71
Political Trust
–0.47***
–4.25
–0.17
–1.85
Constant
1.18*
2.15
–0.24
–0.53
N
513
513
0.13
R2
0.14
8.26***
9.42***
F
Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. Independent variables were not in violation of
multicollinearity (i.e., VIF of each variable < 10 and Tolerance of each variable > 0.10).
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test revealed that there was no heteroskedasticity.

Table 6-2. OLS regression analyses for the relationship between family communication
and political activity.
Offline Political Activity (OFA) Online Political Activity (ONA)
Variables
b
t
b
t
Conversation
0.72***
6.57
0.40***
5.35
Conformity
0.67***
4.95
0.40***
4.82
Education
0.10
1.26
0.10*
1.98
Income
0.13*
2.18
0.06
1.52
Political Ideology
–0.16
–1.12
–0.01
–0.17
Female
–0.55*
–2.34
–0.25
–1.56
Republican
–0.40
–1.07
–0.41
–1.79
Other Parties
–1.05***
–3.59
–0.47*
–2.48
Political Trust
0.18
0.97
–0.08
–0.65
Constant
–1.27
–1.18
–0.95
–1.49
N
513
513
0.25
0.18
R2
F
16.13***
12.35***
Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. Results for offline and online political activity
were based on White’s heteroskedastic robust standard errors because the BreuschPagan/Cook-Weisberg test revealed that there was heteroskedasticity (OFA: χ2 (1) =
25.54, p < 0.05, ONA: χ2 (1) = 12.91, p < 0.05). Independent variables were not in
violation of multicollinearity (i.e., VIF of each variable < 10 and Tolerance of each
variable > 0.10).
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Table 7. OLS regression analyses for the relationship between political consumerism and
political activity.
Offline Political Activity (OFA) Online Political Activity (ONA)
Variables
b
t
b
t
Boycotting
0.52***
5.21
0.32***
5.25
Buycotting
0.51***
4.52
0.42***
5.76
Education
0.06
0.78
0.07
1.44
Income
0.11
1.87
0.04
1.04
Political Ideology
–0.30*
–2.07
–0.10
–1.26
Female
–0.50*
–2.23
–0.21
–1.47
Republican
–0.32
–0.88
–0.30
–1.45
Other Parties
–1.04***
–3.74
–0.40*
–2.40
Political Trust
0.67***
3.54
0.21
1.71
Constant
0.70
0.80
–0.01
–0.02
N
513
513
R2
0.32
0.32
F
24.82***
25.64***
Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. Results for offline and online political activity
were based on White’s heteroskedastic robust standard errors because the BreuschPagan/Cook-Weisberg test revealed that there was heteroskedasticity (OFA: χ2 (1) =
74.08, p < 0.001, ONA: χ2 (1) = 76.16, p < 0.001). Independent variables were not in
violation of multicollinearity (i.e., VIF of each variable < 10 and Tolerance of each
variable > 0.10).

Path Analysis: Testing the Mediating Role of Political Consumerism
This study also posed a research question about the extent to which political
consumerism mediates the relationship between family communication and political
activity (RQ1). For this reason, the effects of the two orientations of family
communication on offline and online political activity, controlling for boycotting and
buycotting behaviors, needed to be further analyzed. To test the mediation effects of
political consumerism, path analysis using AMOS 25 was conducted. Path analysis uses
simple bivariate correlations to estimate the strength of the causal paths between
variables in the model (Hair et al., 2010; Kline, 2011). To determine which control
factors to include in the path diagram, an additional two multiple regression analyses
were run that included all variables and analyzed offline political activity and online
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political activity as the dependent variables. The tests of VIF and tolerance indicated no
violation of multicollinearity in all independent variables. However, the BreuschPagan/Cook-Weisberg test revealed that there was heteroskedasticity as the fitted values
of offline political activity, χ2(1) = 67.62, p < 0.001, and online political activity, χ2(1) =
61.85, p < 0.001, were smaller than 0.05. Due to this, White’s heteroskedastic robust
standard error was run as a remedial measure, and this study reports those results.
Together, all independent and control variables in the model accounted for a
significant portion of the variance in offline political activity, R2 = 0.37, F(11, 511) =
24.95, p < 0.001 and online political activity, R2 = 0.35, F(11, 511) = 25.48, p < 0.001.
The control factors of education, income, political ideology, and partisan identity (i.e.,
Republican or Democrat) did not have a significant association with offline political
activity. However, the control factors of gender, other political parties (i.e., not
Republican or Democrat), and political trust were significantly associated with offline
political activity. The results indicated that one unit change in gender results in a decrease
of 0.46 in offline political activity (b = –0.46, t = –2.10). Furthermore, one unit change in
other parties results in a decrease of 0.80 in offline political activity (b = –0.80, t = –
2.96). Lastly, one unit change in political trust results in an increase of 0.47 in offline
political activity (b = 0.47, t = 2.58), controlling for the effects of other independent
variables in the model. Regarding online political activity, none of the control variables
were significant. Therefore, gender, other parties, and political trust were the control
variables included in the path diagram, with pathways between them and offline political
activity (See Table 8).
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Table 8. OLS regression analyses for the relationship between all variables and political
activity.
Offline Political Activity (OFA) Online Political Activity (ONA)
Variables

b

t

b

t

Conversation
0.53***
5.12
0.24***
3.72
Conformity
0.43**
3.46
0.22**
2.94
Boycotting
0.49***
5.02
0.31***
5.08
Buycotting
0.36**
3.23
0.36***
4.81
Education
0.06
0.77
0.06
1.46
Income
0.10
1.68
0.03
0.89
Political Ideology
–0.23
–1.72
–0.07
–0.89
Female
–0.46*
–2.10
–0.19
–1.31
Republican
–0.12
–0.34
–0.20
–0.98
Other Parties
–0.80**
–2.96
–0.28
–1.70
Political Trust
0.47*
2.58
0.12
0.98
Constant
–1.76
–1.73
–1.23*
–2.10
N
513
513
0.32
0.32
R2
F
24.82***
25.64***
Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05. Results for offline and online political activity
were based on White’s heteroskedastic robust standard errors because the BreuschPagan/Cook-Weisberg test revealed that there was heteroskedasticity (OFA: χ2 (1) =
67.62, p < 0.001, ONA: χ2 (1) = 61.85, p < 0.001). Independent variables were not in
violation of multicollinearity (i.e., VIF of each variable < 10 and Tolerance of each
variable > 0.10).

To validate the mediation effects of political consumerism, this study employed a
bootstrapping procedure (N = 5,000), which is a computer-based technique of resampling
that allows for the estimation of standard errors and confidence intervals (Kline, 2011).
Preacher and Hayes (2008) recommend bootstrapping to examine mediation effects, as it
“provides the most powerful and reasonable method of obtaining confidence limits for
specific indirect effects under most conditions” (p. 886). For path analysis, the overall
model fit was assessed using the following fit indices: the χ2 goodness-of-fit statistic, the
comparative fit index (CFI), the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), and the
root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). Criteria established by Hair et al.
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(2010) was followed to determine whether the model was considered to have acceptable
fit. Specifically, the desired values for the different fit indices were based on the sample
size (N ≥ 250) and the number of indicators (m ≥ 30). The model achieved good fit if the
χ2 statistic was significant, as well as CFI ≥ 0.90, SRMR ≤ 0.08 with CFI ≥ 0.92, and
RMSEA ≤ 0.07 with CFI ≥ 0.90. To evaluate the mediation effects of political
consumerism, this study conducted a bias-corrected bootstrapping procedure based on
5,000 bootstrap resamples (N = 5,000), and 95% confidence intervals were implemented
to determine the significance of these effects (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). According to
criteria set forth by Hair et al. (2010), the final path analysis achieved an acceptable
model fit, χ2 = 29.28, df = 9, χ2/df = 3.25, p < 0.01, CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.066, and
SRMR = 0.034.
Path analysis confirmed the results of multiple regression analyses for hypothesis
testing. Specifically, the path analysis revealed the positive relationship between the two
orientations of family communication – conversation orientation and conformity
orientation – and the two main forms of political consumerism – boycotting and
buycotting (H1a, H1b). The conversation orientation was statistically and positively
associated with both boycotting: β = 0.13, p < 0.01, 95% CI [.041, .215] and buycotting:
β = 0.21, p < 0.001, 95% CI [.130, .293]. Similarly, the conformity orientation was
statistically and positively associated with boycotting: β = 0.20, p < 0.001, 95% CI [.116,
.286] and buycotting: β = 0.23, p < 0.001, 95% CI [.145, .311]. The path analysis further
confirmed the positive relationship between the two orientations of family
communication and the two modes of political activity (H2a, H2b). The conversation
orientation was statistically and positively associated with both offline political activity: β
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= 0.24, p < 0.01, 95% CI [.157, .304] and online political activity: β = 0.18, p < 0.01,
95% CI [.100, .250]. Similarly, the conformity orientation was statistically and positively
associated with both offline political activity: β = 0.13, p < 0.01, 95% CI [.054, .206] and
online political activity: β = 0.12, p < 0.01, 95% CI [.043, .184]. Finally, the path analysis
further confirmed the positive relationship between the two forms of political
consumerism and the two types of political activity – offline political activity and online
political activity (H3a, H3b). Both forms of political consumerism, boycotting: β = 0.26,
p < 0.001, 95% CI [.162, .359] and buycotting: β = 0.16, p < 0.01, 95% CI [.059, .249]
were statistically and positively associated with offline political activity. Additionally,
boycotting: β = 0.26, p < 0.001, 95% CI [.166, .357] and buycotting: β = 0.25, p < 0.001,
95% CI [.152, .343] were statistically and positively associated with online political
activity (See Table 9).
Based on the regression results, three control variables – gender, other parties, and
political trust – were included in the path analysis to further examine their effects on
offline political activity. Gender: β = –0.06, p < 0.05, 95% CI [–.112, –.010], and other
parties: β = –0.09, p < 0.01, 95% CI [–.146, –.042] were found to be significant and
negatively associated with offline political activity. Meanwhile, political trust was found
as a significant and positive factor associated with offline political activity: β = 0.07, p <
0.05, 95% CI [.013, .121] (See Table 9).
The present study also posed a research question (RQ1) about the mediating role
of political consumerism on the relationship between family communication and political
activity. The results showed significant indirect effects of the conversation orientation on
offline political activity, β = 0.03, p < 0.01, 95% CI [.042, .162], and online political
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activity, β = 0.03, p < 0.01, 95% CI [.024, .101], through boycotting. There were also
significant indirect effects of the conformity orientation on offline political activity, β =
0.05, p < 0.001, 95% CI [.099, .253], and online political activity, β = 0.05, p < 0.001,
95% CI [.064, .169], through boycotting. Furthermore, the results showed significant
indirect effects of the conversation orientation on offline political activity, β = 0.03, p <
0.01, 95% CI [.043, .149], and online political activity, β = 0.05, p < 0.01, 95% CI [.050,
.135], through buycotting. There were also significant indirect effects of the conformity
orientation on offline political activity, β = 0.04, p < 0.01, 95% CI [.053, .186], and
online political activity, β = 0.06, p < 0.001, 95% CI [.070, .177], through buycotting
(See Table 10).
While a full mediation occurs when the direct effect becomes nonsignificant in
the presence of the indirect effect, partial mediation is present when the direct effect is
reduced, but still significant (Hair et al., 2010). As the results for H2a and H2b indicated,
there was a significant direct effect of family communication on political activity, which
means that political consumerism (boycotting and buycotting) partially mediated the
relationship between family communication (conversation orientation and conformity
orientation) and political activity (offline and online political activity) (See Figure 2).
These results suggest that interactions within the family setting can motivate children to
engage in political consumption during adulthood, which subsequently makes them more
likely to take part in other types of political activity during adulthood.
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Figure 2. Bootstrapping (N = 5,000) results for path diagram of family communication,
political consumerism, and political activity. Model fit indices: χ2 = 29.28, df = 9, χ2/df =
3.25, p < 0.01, CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.066, and SRMR = 0.034.
***p < .001, **p < .01., *p < .05.

Table 9. Hypothesis testing in the proposed path analysis model using Bootstrapping (N
= 5,000)
Standard
Hs
Parameters
Coefficient
S.E.
p
95% CI
(β)
H1a

FC (CVO)

→

BOY

0.13

0.04

0.006

[0.04, 0.22]

H1a

FC (CFO)

→

BOY

0.20

0.04

***

[0.12, 0.29]

H1b

FC (CVO)

→

BUY

0.21

0.04

***

[0.13, 0.29]

H1b

FC (CFO)

→

BUY

0.23

0.04

***

[0.15, 0.31]

H2a

FC (CVO)

→

OFA

0.24

0.04

0.001

[0.16, 0.30]

H2a

FC (CFO)

→

OFA

0.13

0.04

0.002

[0.05, 0.21]

H2b

FC (CVO)

→

ONA

0.18

0.04

0.001

[0.10, 0.25]

H2b

FC (CFO)

→

ONA

0.12

0.04

0.002

[0.04, 0.18]

H3a

BOY

→

OFA

0.26

0.05

***

[0.16, 0.36]

H3a

BOY

→

ONA

0.26

0.05

***

[0.17, 0.36]

H3b

BUY

→

OFA

0.16

0.05

0.003

[0.06, 0.25]

H3b

BUY

→

ONA

0.25

0.05

***

[0.15, 0.34]
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Table 9 (continued).
Hs

Parameters

Standard
Coefficient
(β)

S.E.

p

95% CI

-

OP

→

OFA

-0.09

0.03

0.001

[-0.15, -0.04]

-

GEN

→

OFA

-0.06

0.03

0.022

[-0.11, -0.01]

-

PT

→

ONA

0.07

0.03

0.015

[0.01, 0.12]

Note. S.E.: bootstrap standard errors, CI: confidence intervals, FC (CVO): family
communication – conversation orientation, FC (CFO): family communication –
conformity orientation, BOY: boycotting, BUY: buycotting, OFA: offline political
activity, ONA: online political activity, OP: other parties, GEN: gender, PT: political
trust.

Table 10. Standardized specific indirect effects in the path analysis using Bootstrapping
(N = 5,000)
Standardized
Parameters
Coefficient
p
95% CI
(β)
FC (CVO)

→

BOY

→

OFA

0.03

0.003

[0.04, 0.16]

FC (CVO)

→

BOY

→

ONA

0.03

0.005

[0.02, 0.10]

FC (CVO)

→

BUY

→

OFA

0.03

0.003

[0.04, 0.15]

FC (CVO)

→

BUY

→

ONA

0.05

0.001

[0.05, 0.14]

FC (CFO)

→

BOY

→

OFA

0.05

***

[0.10, 0.25]

FC (CFO)

→

BOY

→

ONA

0.05

0.001

[0.06, 0.17]

FC (CFO)

→

BUY

→

OFA

0.04

0.004

[0.05, 0.19]

FC (CFO)

→

BUY

→

ONA

0.06

0.001

[0.07, 0.18]

Note. CI: confidence intervals, FC (CVO): family communication – conversation
orientation, FC (CFO): family communication – conformity orientation, BOY:
boycotting, BUY: buycotting, OFA: offline political activity, ONA: online political
activity.
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DISCUSSION
Overall, this study aimed to explore the role of the family as a key antecedent to
political consumerism. The relationship between political consumerism and engagement
in other forms of political activity was also investigated in this study. Through hypothesis
testing, the conversation and conformity orientations of family communication were both
shown to positively affect different types of political consumption, as well as online and
offline political activity. Both forms of political consumption also had positive and
significant effects on online and offline political activity. Multiple regression analysis
further revealed that gender, political party, and political trust negatively affected
boycotting behaviors, while none of the control variables impacted buycotting behaviors.
Following multiple regression analysis, the mediation effect of political consumerism
was tested via path analysis, revealing that political consumerism mediates the
relationship between family communication patterns and political activity. The results
and their implications are explored in greater depth in the following sections.
Family Communication as a Key Antecedent for Political Consumption
Both orientations of family communication patterns were found to be positive
predictors of boycotting and buycotting. In other words, children raised in high
conversation and high conformity homes were likely to engage in political consumption
as adults. These results are consistent with the idea that political consumers are prone to
participate in political discussions with family and friends, often engaging in these
conversations face-to-face. Political consumers often inform others about political
consumerism, openly passing along this knowledge to them, meaning that these
conversations among family members may involve direct mentions of political
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consumption efforts (Kelm & Dohle, 2018). Although individuals can become informed
about political consumerism through other networks, like the news media, the present
study’s findings uphold previous claims that face-to-face communication can increase
one’s desire or willingness to participate in political consumption activities (Kelm &
Dohle, 2018; Shah et al., 2007). Ultimately, this study confirms that interactions within
the family context can significantly impact the political development of children by
making them more likely to engage in political consumption as adults.
It is interesting to note that families high on either family communication
orientation are likely to participate in boycotting and buycotting. Although these findings
were consistent with H1a, there was no support for H1b, as it posited that family
communication would be negatively associated with buycotting. While boycotts are often
collective endeavors and more prominent in the media, meaning that they may come up
more frequently in conversation, family communication can positively promote
buycotting, too. Copeland (2014a) offers a possible explanation for these results, arguing
that buycotts tend to involve more informal learning; as opposed to the news media,
citizens learn about products or companies that uphold similar values through their
friends, family members, and social groups. Seeing as buycotting is less visible and rarely
linked to any organized efforts, critical information needed to get involved in buycotts
may not be readily accessible through more official channels of political information.
Additionally, buycotting is typically carried out by more altruistic and politically
interested individuals (Copeland, 2014a; Neilson, 2010). Individuals who buycott
sacrifice convenience, low prices, and a wider selection of goods or services to make
conscious consumption choices that benefit the favorable business as well as contribute to
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the greater good. One may not be compelled give up the accessibility or reduced prices of
a product after learning about buycotting through the news or on social media, but they
may be more motivated to buycott if they learn about it and discuss its implications
within the family context. The intimacy and trusted nature of the family environment may
promote the sharing of private thoughts, questions, and opinions associated with
buycotting-related decisions. In other words, the family unit, a major socializing agent,
may be a prime location for learning about buycotting and acquiring the motivation and
resources to confidently participate.
Furthermore, it is important to examine the relationship between the two distinct
family communication orientations and political consumption. First, the high
conversation orientation was positively associated with political consumption. This
finding is consistent with prior research indicating that the conversation orientation is
positively related to numerous political outcomes. Families high in the conversation
orientation value the free exchange of ideas and are open to discussing a wide variety of
topics, even if they are controversial. Acts of political consumption can be spurred by an
array of issues rooted in politics, social justice, economics, or the environment, and high
conversation households may be more prone to initiating open and honest conversations
about these topics among family members. In turn, this may increase one’s knowledge
about an issue, help them take a stance on that issue, and determine how they are going to
act to improve or resolve the situation. They also involve children in decision-making
processes, which may enhance their critical thinking skills when it comes to making
consumption choices (Koerner & Fitzpatrick, 2002a).
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Even though high conversation families typically facilitate adolescent political
development and lead to frequent political information behaviors, this study revealed that
high conformity families can effectively instill political consumption behaviors among
children. The positive relationship between the conformity orientation and boycotting and
buycotting may be explained by the fact that high conformity families place great
importance on the uniformity of attitudes and beliefs. Rather than producing independent
thoughts and opinions, children in high conformity environments are expected to adhere
to their family’s belief system and are largely excluded from the decision-making
process, including consumption choices. Even if parents are not political consumers, their
viewpoints pertaining to certain political, social, economic, or environmental issues may
be transmitted to children, who are expected to agree with their parents’ perspective. In
turn, these beliefs and stances can motivate political action, including political
consumption as many of these issues are tied to products and producers. Further, since
individuals from high conformity families are accustomed to expressing viewpoints
consistent with their family’s beliefs, they may be reluctant to share opinions with outside
networks or organizations (Buckner et al., 2013). Therefore, one’s understanding of
political consumption and related practices may be confined to household discussions
and/or observed behaviors, and thus, exclusively, or primarily shaped by family
members. In other words, one’s consumption choices during adulthood may be enduring
choices that reflect their family’s belief system.
While the above explanation is plausible, there are other possible justifications for
the positive association between high conformity families and political consumption.
Recent research has indicated that high conformity families can promote involvement in
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political and public affairs, allowing children to foster the confidence and competence to
effectively participate in politics. The family communication orientations are broad
categories that help distinguish family communication contexts, but families do not fit
perfectly within the categories; they all communicate in a unique manner. High
conformity families may be overprotective and stifle conversation, which can lead to
rebellion against parental authority. However, this is not always the case as high
conformity families who promote healthy parent-child conversations can successfully
transmit political information and instill political behaviors among children (Bristol &
Mangleburg, 2005; Ledbetter, 2015). This may explain the relationship between high
conformity families and political consumption, as this family communication schema has
been proven to effectively promote political information processing behaviors.
Encouraging Offline and Online Political Activity through Family Communication
This study further theorized that family communication during childhood would
be positively associated with offline political activity (H2a), but negatively associated
with online political activity (H2b), during adulthood. As expected and consistent with
past research, family communication during childhood resulted in high levels of offline
political activity during adulthood. Due to having more regular interactions and the
exposure to a variety of topics and viewpoints, children raised in this type of environment
may participate in discussions about political and social issues, which can help them form
an opinion and lead to subsequent participation in various political activities. Adding to
this from a cognitive processing standpoint, this type of family environment can teach
children how to process complex information with reduced levels of anxiety (Ledbetter &
Schrodt, 2008). Given today’s polarizing political landscape and the overwhelming
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amounts of information available, political discussions can be challenging to participate
in and may induce anxiety for some, especially when trying to balance one’s own
political beliefs and interests with the desire to maintain friendly interpersonal
relationships (Pennington & Winfrey, 2021). Yet, having honest and frequent
conversations with other family members who may express disagreement can better
prepare children to participate in productive political discussions outside of the family.
Instead of shying away from politics, children may be more willing to discuss divisive
political issues, which may boost feelings of self-efficacy and increase willingness to
engage in various political activities.
The positive relationship between high conformity families and offline political
participation has also been backed by prior research. Children who must adhere to family
norms and expectations are accustomed to refraining from expressing controversial
opinions, and thus, may be able to consume political information from various news
sources and interpersonal networks outside the family (Graham et al., 2020; Hively &
Eveland, 2009). For children growing up in high conformity environments, political
discussions may be avoided at all costs, and knowing this, children may seek external
sources or social groups to acquire political information and engage in political
conversations. Through this action, they may become more inclined to participate in
offline political activities, including voting, wearing campaign-related apparel, or
working for a political party or candidate. Another reason that high conformity families
may encourage greater levels of offline political participation is the idea that these family
structures can be overbearing for children who must obey their parents’ wishes. This can
create a hostile family environment and make adolescents more prone to engage in
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deception or rebellion (Bristol & Mangleburg, 2005). If discussions about controversial
issues were consistently shut down, and children were expected to adhere to their parents’
belief system, they may want to branch off as adults and express their own viewpoints via
offline political activity.
The present study also found that childhood family communication was positively
associated with online political activity during adulthood, thus disproving H2b. Although
the effect of family communication on offline political activity was stronger, the effect on
online political activity was still positive and significant. Previous research points to
some possible explanations for this finding. First, prior studies have examined and
documented the shift among younger generations from traditional forms of political
participation to less conventional methods. The integration of politics into digital
mediums can impact teen’s political engagement, as well as entire networks of friends
and acquaintances (Bode et al., 2014). Young people are taking advantage of the
opportunities afforded by technology, and aided by their higher levels of Internet skills,
they are choosing to engage with politics using online platforms (Best & Krueger, 2005;
Oser et al., 2013). Although scholars have raised concerns about younger people losing
interest and becoming less engaged in traditional party-based politics, online political
activity seems to be a feasible avenue for them to increase political engagement.
Therefore, it is important to recognize that if family communication inspires political
participation, that may take root predominantly online for younger generations. This
finding may also point to the appealing characteristics of online political activity,
including the ease of it and the ability to quickly reach a vast audience. By offering
greater convenience, online activities afford citizens greater control over how they choose
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to engage in politics. Therefore, if high conversation and high conformity family
communication environments promote children’s involvement in politics as they get
older, these individuals may elect to participate in online forms of political activity
because they are less time consuming and can be completed from any location.
Another reason for this finding is that online political participation may be a
supplement to offline participation, expanding one’s repertoire of political action.
Previous research has found that online participation does not serve as an exclusive form
of participation, but rather it can cultivate additional participation in other settings (Gil de
Zúñiga et al., 2010; Oser et al., 2013). Therefore, individuals do not necessarily
specialize in one form of political activity over the other. Although people may begin to
participate in new online political activities, they do not automatically serve as a
substitution for disengagement in offline political activity. The present study’s results
provide evidence for what Gil de Zúñiga et al. (2010) deemed “hybrid participation,”
which merges the virtual and real-world spaces of political engagement and participation
to create a modernized version of democracy (p. 45). Despite the differences between
online and offline participation, individuals may find that dual participation is an
effective path to engaged citizenship. As family communication can lead children to
engage in more traditional modes of political activity during adulthood, the expanding
definition of participation means that family communication can also cultivate online
political participation.
Political Consumers are Politically Active Citizens
The results indicated that political consumers are generally more active in various
forms of political participation. This relationship is upheld by previous literature finding
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that political consumers are more active in both conventional and unconventional
participation (Strømsnes, 2009) and online civic participation (Ward & de Vreese, 2011).
However, these findings contradict earlier observations by Stolle et al. (2005), who found
that political consumerism is not exercised together with conventional political acts, as
well as Ward and de Vreese (2011), who asserted that offline political participation does
not have a significant relationship with socially conscious consumption. These findings
suggested a shift away from traditional means to citizenship, where democracy may be
less about political parties, voting, and traditional political knowledge. They also implied
that by engaging in an unconventional political act, political consumers may doubt the
efficacy of more traditional political activities. Yet, the present study found that both
boycotting and buycotting have significant and positive relationships to both online and
offline political activity. It appears that a departure from more conventional modes of
political activity does not necessarily exist among political consumers. Although political
consumers act outside of political institutions, they are not opposed to initiating change
within the traditional political arena.
The link between political consumerism and offline and online political activity
may be explained by the fact that engaging in political consumption can help individuals
develop civic skills and habits of political participation, as well as offer them more
opportunities to be recruited for other political activities (Gotlieb & Cheema, 2017).
Through this process, citizens may begin to believe in their ability to enact political
change and view themselves as valuable participants in the political arena. In particular,
since boycotting is often a collective act, it can serve as a gateway to conventional means
of political participation (Gotlieb & Cheema, 2017). Citizens who have participated in
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boycotts may have met other like-minded citizens who express the same concerns. The
large and highly interconnected boycotting networks can help connect citizens to other
political activities, such as working with a political party or joining a campaign group
(Jungblut & Johnen, 2021). In fact, since boycotters are focused on bringing about broad
industry change, they may be required to engage in other types of political action to
provoke this desired change. For example, environmental protection is a large issue that
likely cannot be solved solely by avoiding products or companies whose practices harm
the environment. As a result, those who advocate for environmental protection may also
speak with public officials about the issue in person, contact the media to speak on the
topic and create issue awareness, or work for a political candidate with environmental
protection at the forefront of their agenda. Ultimately, the organized and large-scale
efforts of boycotters help to explain the link between boycotting and offline political
activity.
Furthermore, this study unexpectedly found a positive relationship between
boycotting and online political activity. However, this may be explained by the growth of
the Internet and digital forms of communication. Boycotts typically attract greater media
attention, and in turn, the media is often a major source of information for boycotters.
With the growth of social networking sites and the move by news outlets to online
platforms, perhaps boycotters are turning to the Internet to consume and even produce
political information. As boycotters become accustomed to gathering information and
interacting online, they may become exposed to other means of online political
engagement. For example, they may come across hashtags on social media that they want
to use related to a political or social issue. There are also key parallels between online
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political activity and political consumption. In the same way that citizens can indicate
their support for specific political or social causes through changing their social media
profile picture, citizens can engage in political consumption to express support for
specific causes, such as fair-trade practices, animal rights, and sustainability efforts
(Boulianne, 2021; Chapman & Coffé, 2016). Furthermore, the use of hashtags or profile
picture frames is typically done collectively to show unified support toward a specific
political or social cause. Similarly, boycotts are often employed to collectively express
negative sentiments regarding a company’s unfavorable policies or practices. Due to the
similarities between boycotting and online political activity, as well as the growth of
social media and news consumption via the Internet, individuals who engage in
boycotting are also likely to be politically active online.
Furthermore, this study confirmed that buycotting is positively associated with
online political activity. This finding seems sensible, as buycotting is a more informal
and individualistic activity that occurs outside of traditional political institutions and is
associated with higher levels of political interest (Copeland, 2014a; Jungblut & Johnen,
2021). Posting to social media to encourage others to take political action is likewise a
less formal activity, and it is oftentimes driven by political interest as well as selfmotivation. Furthermore, positive information does not promote buycotting to the same
degree that negative information causes boycotting (Kam & Deichert, 2020). Citizens
must possess an independent desire to engage in buycotting, and they often must do their
own research about companies and products that are compatible with their values and
political stances. Due to the self-directed nature of buycotting, individuals who partake in
this form of political consumption may be prone to engage in further political action
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outside of the traditional realm of politics, which may include communicating their
political sentiments via online channels.
Although buycotting has more characteristics in common with civic engagement
taking place outside of traditional political institutions, the present study found that
buycotting positively and significantly predicted offline political activity. Buycotters act
more independently, but they still aim to benefit the well-being of others through their
conscious consumption, which may explain why they would still be prone to engage in
more traditional, offline political activity. They may join others in protesting for a
political cause, attend a political rally with others, or encourage others to vote in
upcoming elections, as these modes of civic engagement can benefit the public wellbeing and are necessary for a well-functioning democracy. Although individuals derive a
sense of fulfillment through buycotting, they may believe that due to its lack of visibility
in the media and the amount of mobilization needed to make buycotting efforts effective,
they need to tap into other types of political activity directly within the political sphere.
Political Consumption: A Mediator between Family Communication and Political
Activity
Results from the path analysis indicated that political consumption partially
mediated the effect of family communication on political activity. Although family
communication had a direct effect on offline and online political activity, political
consumption amplified this effect. Political consumption can be time-consuming, as
people must investigate company practices and policies and research alternative brands or
products that operate under favorable conditions. Political consumers are politically
interested and committed to using private consumption choices as a vehicle to enact
political or social change in the public sphere. Given these defining factors, it is
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unsurprising that political consumers would likely be motivated to engage in other forms
of political participation. Many of the issues and injustices driving political consumption
are large problems with far-reaching consequences, and thus may need to be addressed
via other means of political action. This is especially true since political consumerism has
limits in its ability to promote political and social change. Oftentimes, boycotts
completely fail due to poor planning and a short-lived commitment to a political or social
cause (Micheletti, 2003). Even the most dedicated political consumers do not view
political consumerism as the most effective means of influencing political and social
change (Stolle et al., 2005). Although the perceived efficacy of participants’ political
consumption is beyond the scope of this study, political consumers likely depend on other
avenues of political participation to successfully advocate for political and social change.
The mediation effect of political consumerism implies that unconventional forms
of political activity can amplify the effects of family communication on a variety of
political activities. Whereas many traditional political activities are magnified during
election years, political consumerism and alternative forms of political participation are
less confined to election cycles (Feezell, 2016). Their prevalence during and between
election years can help citizens develop and fortify their habits of political participation,
which in turn, may increase their competency and desire to perform other political
activities, especially those that arise during elections such as voting, working for a
political candidate, or donating to a political campaign.
Another important aspect to consider is the politicization of everyday life in the
form of consumption choices. Politics extend beyond traditional political settings and
institutions to include private beliefs, choices, and behaviors, which can be learned via
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socialization through the family. Consumption choices exist at the intersection of moral
values and ethics of care, often centering on family needs. Political consumers are
influenced by the individuals with whom they interact and the societies in which they
live. The results of this study suggest that the family unit is an important context for
understanding the implications of consumption choices and defining the values that
impact these decisions. While buycotting is often learned informally through friends and
family, boycotting entails more collective pressures which, similarly, can be applied
through friends and family looking to recruit more participants via their own social
networks. Repeated, positive social interactions between individuals can provide the
necessary information and motivation for effecting social change.
It is interesting to note that political consumerism had a stronger mediating effect
on the relationship between the conformity orientation and political activity. Those that
grow up in high conformity environments may avoid sensitive or challenging political
issues, especially since they could spark disagreement. This can negatively impact their
direct level of involvement in political activities. However, political consumerism can
cultivate political participation habits, build political efficacy, and provide more exposure
and opportunities to get involved in different political activities. Therefore, if individuals
become motivated to base their consumption decisions on political or social concerns,
they may become more inclined to engage in offline and online political activities.
Looking at specific indirect effects, buycotting had a strong mediating effect on the
relationship between family communication and online political activity. If family
communication promotes buycotting behaviors, this can spur similar modes of
engagement that take place online, which are typically informal and individualistic as
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they occur outside of the traditional political arena. Additionally, boycotting had a strong
mediating effect on the relationship between the conformity orientation and political
activity. Those who grew up in high conformity environments may be hesitant to share
opinions with outside networks, but through exposure to organized boycotting efforts,
they may meet other like-minded individuals, be recruited to more political activities, and
gain the confidence to participate more in politics.
Additional Antecedents to Political Consumerism: Trust, Political Party, and
Gender
With regard to control variables, those who identified with other political parties
were less likely to engage in boycotting, as well as offline and online political activity,
compared to those who identified with either the Democratic Party or Republican Party.
This is consistent with other studies that find that expressive partisanship, or one’s
enduring identity as either a Democrat or a Republican, influences campaign activity and
electoral participation (Endres & Panagopoulos, 2017; Huddy et al., 2015). Partisanship
can be viewed as a social identity, motivating citizens to take certain political action
based on their party’s needs (Huddy et al., 2015). The present study inquired about
political activity during the 2020 election year, which may explain the link between
partisan identity and offline and online political action. The finding that independents and
members of other political parties were less likely to engage in boycotting signals the key
role of political identity in consumer decisions. Political identity, which can be activated
subconsciously at different times, has been shown to affect consumer behavior (Jung &
Mittal, 2020). Although political identity extends beyond party affiliation, issues are
often framed along party lines, and companies or products can be associated with a
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certain party or political figure (e.g., boycotting companies that do business with the
Trump family).
In line with previous research, political trust was a significant and negative
predictor of boycotting. However, political trust did not have any significant effects on
buycotting. The fact that buycotting is reward-oriented and boycotting is punishmentoriented may be the reason for this difference. A lack of trust in political institutions may
make citizens feel increasingly cynical, and in turn, more inclined to punish companies
who act unfavorably. Boycotts are often part of organized efforts to punish a company
and attract negative media attention, which may continue to fuel feelings of frustration
and distrust. Although political trust had a negative relationship with boycotting, it was
positively related to offline political activity. This difference may exist because those
who possess greater trust in political institutions and public officials will be motivated to
engage in more direct action within the political system. Whereas boycotters rely on the
marketplace instead of political institutions to express their political grievances, citizens
engaging in offline political activities are often operating within the traditional political
arena.
Regarding political consumerism, there were no significant effects for education,
income, political ideology, or gender. This contradicts previous research arguing that
political consumers are well-educated individuals earning high incomes. Perhaps political
information and product details are becoming more widely accessible in the digital age,
allowing more people to consume these facts and make thoughtful consumption
decisions. Another reason may be that mediated messages about boycotting efforts are
reaching more people of all education levels. Further, as the importance and awareness
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surrounding corporate social responsibility efforts increases, ethical and sustainable
alternatives that are affordable may be entering the marketplace, thus reducing the
importance of having a higher income. There were also no significant effects of political
ideology, which is inconsistent with prior research that shows ideological intensity is
positively associated with political consumerism. It is possible that political consumerism
is gaining more recognition as a viable avenue of political action, and as a result,
individuals across the ideological spectrum are finding that they can address specific
political or social causes they are passionate about via deliberate consumption choices.
Finally, this study revealed no significant effects of gender on boycotting and
buycotting. Previous research reported mixed results regarding gender, with some
scholars finding that women were more likely to practice political consumption than men.
Women were thought to be more active political consumers because they are typically
more isolated from the formal political arena (Micheletti, 2003), and they often assume
the traditional role of shopping for the family (Neilson, 2010). However, traditional
gender norms, including a woman’s role in the political sphere, are evolving. As more
women work full-time jobs and defy the traditional stereotype of serving as the primary
caregiver, men may be shopping for the family just as much or more than women. A
growing dependence on the global marketplace has also led to more citizens considering
the consequences of their consumption choices, and with this issue becoming more
pronounced, gender disparities once apparent in political consumption may disappear.
The path analysis results indicated that men were more likely than women to
participate in offline political activity. Notably, there were no gender differences when it
came to online political activity, which aligns with the findings of Oser et al. (2013).
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Although women have made great strides in the traditional political sphere, perhaps they
are taking advantage of the ease and accessibility of online political action. Independents
and other political parties negatively predicted offline political activity, as well. Since
offline political participation is rooted in many party-based actions, such as donating
money to a campaign and working for a political candidate, partisan identity can be a key
force driving this engagement. While independent voters and those belonging to smaller
political parties are still politically active and invested in election campaigns, strong
partisan identity with the two major political parties may provoke greater offline political
activity, especially during an election year. Lastly, individuals with higher levels of
political trust were found to participate more frequently in offline political activity. As
stated earlier, many offline political activities occur within the political system. If citizens
feel disappointed, frustrated, or cynical about the government system or the leaders
within that system, they will likely want to circumvent them to exercise their political
voice. Therefore, higher levels of political trust will make individuals more willing to
direct their actions toward political institutions.
Implications
This study provides theoretical contributions by exploring the link between family
communication patterns and different types of political activity. The relationship between
household communication environments and engagement in political consumerism has
been underexplored. Previous research has indicated that face-to-face communication can
exert a strong influence on political consumption activity, and political consumers are
more likely to discuss politics with family members. Although these findings suggested a
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link between parent-child interactions and political consumerism, family communication
patterns theory had not been directly applied to studies examining this relationship.
This study reveals that high conversation and high conformity families can
encourage children to consider the ethical, social, and political implications of their
consumption choices during adulthood. Specifically, family communication can lead
individuals to boycott products or brands, an action that involves more collective action
and gains greater media recognition. However, this study adds that family
communication can also encourage buycotting behavior, likely through a family’s ability
to serve as a site of informal learning. The family can provide key information related to
buycotting that would otherwise require extra research on behalf of the buycotter, and a
tight-knit family can apply unique pressures to engage in buycotting. The effect of family
communication on political consumption and political activity in general also points to
the strong influence of face-to-face interpersonal communication.
Additionally, this study provides that both orientations of family communication
can have a positive influence on political consumption. This finding supports prior
research that the conversation orientation enhances political development and leads to a
variety of political behaviors. This study also finds a positive relationship between the
conformity orientation and political consumption, thus lending support to the idea that the
conformity orientation does not necessarily hinder political development, which has
emerged in recent research. Despite seemingly stark differences between the conversation
and conformity orientations, the family is a dynamic social unit that can promote similar
outcomes through different communicative approaches.
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The main contribution of this study is that it points to the mediating role of
political consumerism. Although family political communication can lead to offline and
online political activity, the degree of participation is amplified when individuals are also
political consumers. These results imply that political consumption is a powerful
instrument that inspires political action beyond the marketplace. It entails intentional,
thought-out consumption choices that are based on an understanding of the underlying
political or social issues at play. It also requires individuals to seek out alternative
products, which for many, involves finding those of comparable price and quality. The
effort demanded of political consumers, therefore, suggests that they are dedicated to
political and social causes and will take additional routes of political action to bring about
desired change. These results also support the argument that political consumerism is not
an alternative approach to politics, but rather a supplement to other forms of political
participation. Rather than expressing frustration with other forms of political action and
isolating themselves, political consumers embrace other means of political action, both
offline and online. The willingness to engage in offline and online activity suggests that
“hybrid participation” may be commonplace in a digital era dominated by social media
(Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2010, p. 45).
The findings also offer practical implications, pointing to the power of political
consumerism to revitalize civic engagement. Once thought to be an uncommon and
alternative form of political action, political consumerism has become a mainstream form
of participation (ANES, 2020). It can appeal to a wide range of people who may be
focused on addressing different political or social issues. Engagement in political
consumerism can promote additional political action, which is important considering
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recent concerns related to reduced voter turnout and political apathy. The ability to send
political messages via purchasing decisions presents a creative way for citizens to get
involved in political or social causes. Through advocating for political or social change in
the marketplace, consumers may be compelled to continue their efforts through other
offline and online political activity. In today’s globalized society, political consumerism
may provide a gateway for citizens to become engaged, or re-engaged, in politics.
The growth of political consumption and its ability to be cultivated through family
discussion also has important implications for businesses. Aside from relying on their
own knowledge and experiences with a company, consumers often learn about brands
through word-of-mouth. Within the family setting, family consumption choices are
visible (e.g., where parents choose to grocery shop) and negative and positive
information related to brands can be shared easily. Given the positive relationship
between family communication and political consumption, it is crucial for companies to
consider their political brand communication and how it could be perceived by
consumers (Jung & Mittal, 2019). Companies should continually review their practices,
monitor employee and consumer discourse, and remain responsive to any complaints. It
is also wise to reflect on their positions regarding social issues and be prepared to
communicate their stance. In an era of growing CEO activism, there are increasingly
more expectations placed on business leaders to speak out on political and social issues.
The positions articulated by CEOs can garner greater support from consumers or repel
consumers from a brand; at the same time, staying silent on issues can be even more
consequential for companies. The growth of political consumerism can encourage more
civic engagement and enhance the functioning of democracy by holding companies
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accountable for their business practices and by mobilizing political consumers to engage
in additional political activities.
Limitations and Future Directions
This study has certain limitations that should be addressed. First, the survey
questions for offline and online political activity were associated with the 2020 election
year, which may have conflated respondents’ amount of participation. Moreover, the
survey instrument for political consumption asked participants if they had ever engaged
in boycotting or buycotting behaviors. In retrospect, it would have been effective to
measure political consumerism within a specific time period, such as over the span of a
year, or for participants to rank their political consumption tendencies on a frequency
scale. Individuals may be motivated to boycott when there is clear public outrage and/or
extensive media coverage, but other than that, they might not actively practice political
consumerism. Those who are infrequent political consumers should be separated from the
moderate to regular political consumers to achieve a richer analysis.
Furthermore, the measure of political consumption is broad; while it is important
to differentiate between boycotting and buycotting, studies could break down political
consumption even further. Certain industries, as well as specific products and services,
may be boycotted or buycotted by different people due to their unique circumstances
(Baek, 2010). There could be fascinating associations between one’s household
environment growing up, which influences a large part of their worldview, and their
patterns of political consumption. Dualcotting should also be examined in future
research, since those who boycott and buycott may be more politically active than
individuals who specialize in one form of political consumption. Dualcotters possess
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higher levels of political knowledge, follow politics more closely, and have higher levels
of external efficacy (Baek, 2010; Copeland, 2014a). Those who keep up with current
political news will likely have a good understanding of relevant political issues and feel
better equipped to participate in politics. By possessing strong external efficacy,
dualcotters will also be inclined to take political action because they believe the
government will be responsive to their needs.
Furthermore, the effects of social desirability might have factored into
participants’ responses (Ward & de Vreese, 2011). For example, when asked whether
they considered the social or political values of a company when purchasing their
products, participants may be tempted to answer “yes,” due to the human tendency to
want to present themselves in a positive light. Future studies can mitigate this effect by
asking additional questions related to political consumption, such as whether participants
check company websites for information on company ethics or philanthropy work. Rather
than framing political consumption as a catch-all behavior based on political, social,
ethical, or environmental considerations, more specific questions regarding the motives
for consumption choices could be employed, as well. This would allow researchers to
gain further insight into the unique behaviors of each political consumer.
Although this study controlled for certain socio-demographic variables, future
research should pay specific attention to the relationship between race and political
activity. Due to their history of political marginalization and distrust in the government,
racial and ethnic minority groups have been found to participate less in traditional politics
(Diemer & Li, 2011; Hope et al., 2016; Verba et al., 1995). Instead, unconventional
routes of political action, such as boycotting and buycotting, may be effective ways for

91
marginalized groups to influence political and social change by acting outside of political
institutions. At the same time, racial and ethnic minorities may be hesitant to engage in
political activism and advocacy. For example, in the sports context, Black athletes may
be silent on social and political issues because they believe their views will subject them
to hateful responses, invoke racial stereotypes, and lead to organizational pushback
(Sanderson et al., 2016). Thus, it is important to consider how race and ethnicity might
factor into one’s degree of political participation and the type of political action taken.
Furthermore, inequalities in political participation are shaped across generations,
making it critical to examine how family background influences political activity. For
example, Verba et al. (2003) found that, due to disparities in parental education, White
children are more likely than Latino and Black children to experience politically
stimulating home environments and become well-educated, which creates better
prospects of political involvement. While some studies have found that political
consumerism is practiced predominately among White individuals (Stolle et al., 2005),
others have revealed insignificant findings (Endres & Panagopoulos, 2017). Nonetheless,
as political consumerism expands as a viable tool of political action, the relationship
between race and ethnicity and political consumerism demands further exploration.
Another limitation involves the framing of family communication patterns as a
one-way transfer of beliefs and attitudes from parents to children. Family communication
involves an agreement between family members, and it is important to recognize
children’s agency in the socialization process (Liebes & Ribak, 1992; York, 2019).
Political socialization is a bidirectional process, and family communication can
collectively benefit from adolescents’ increased desire to discuss public affairs (Flores et
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al., 2020; McDevitt & Chaffee, 2002). Children can gather political information and
different viewpoints from external sources and pass this along to parents, which can
stimulate parent-child political conversations (McDevitt & Chaffee, 2002; York, 2019).
This “trickle-up” perspective is particularly important to examine considering social
media’s ability to quickly connect youth to massive amounts of political news and
information, even if it occurs through incidental news exposure (York, 2019). Political
consumers are active on social media, and these platforms can be used to seek out and
transmit information related to political consumption efforts (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2014a).
Therefore, future research should recognize children’s agency in the family political
socialization process by examining their influence on parental political consumption.
The prevalence of social media also offers new opportunities for political
information sharing and political activity. Compared to traditional media, where
discussions are typically scripted and unidirectional, social media channels provide an
arena for individuals to reinforce and challenge group norms and values (Sanderson et al.,
2016). Through online political activism, like-minded individuals can collectively rally
behind certain causes to alter the status quo instituted by those in power (Dynel & Poppi,
2021). Considering the growth of online political activism, future research should
examine family political information seeking behaviors to glean insight on where
families acquire the majority of their political information and how their information
sources shape their participatory habits, including political consumption.
Additionally, the RFCP scale treats the family as a cohesive unit and does not
account for different family structures. When examining political socialization through
the family, it is important to consider the separate effects exerted by each parent.
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Previous research by Shulman and DeAndrea (2014), for example, investigated the
independent influences of the mother and father on children’s political similarity. Since
mothers and fathers often differ in their communication styles, their influence on
children’s political attitudes and political consumption habits could vary. Family
communication patterns research could also be expanded by looking at the influence of
siblings. Siblings share a special bond, which would make it interesting to explore this
familial aspect in greater depth. To what degree do sibling relationships affect the family
communication environment and help shape one’s political attitudes and behaviors?
Moreover, studies often regard the family as a traditional unit composed of
heterosexual parents and blood-related children. Yet, this limited definition fails to
account for nontraditional familial bonds such as those between children and LGBTQ
parents, stepparents, adoptive parents, and more (Flores et al., 2020). Among racial and
ethnic minority groups, the family also has a particularly profound influence due to the
shared experience of being a cultural minority. Within these families, parents and
children can engage in mutual education, sharing racial, linguistic, and cultural resources
with one another (Flores et al., 2020; Yoo, 2020). Ultimately, future research on political
activity should pay greater attention to political socialization in families with members of
marginalized communities, as well as in families with nontraditional relationships.
Future research should also consider the impact of political interest on the
relationship between family communication and political consumerism. Individuals with
greater political interest and stronger political opinions are more likely to be political
consumers, as this mode of participation is activated by political values (Copeland &
Boulianne, 2020; Neilson & Paxton, 2010). Although scholars have posited that political
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interest predicts political consumption, the potential of political interest as a moderator
variable merits future investigation. In the context of this study, while family political
discussions could encourage political consumption, low political interest could nullify
this effect since those with low political interest pay less attention to politics. Conversely,
individuals with high political interest may be more aware of political consumption
efforts, familiar with their underlying political issues, and motivated to research and seek
out alternative products, thus strengthening the relationship between family
communication and political consumerism.
Finally, survey research can oversimplify political consumption as these choices
are complex and “can be represented by diverse and sometimes incompatible motives”
(Atkinson, 2015, p. 2061). Considering this limitation, future research could benefit from
examining the connection between family communication and political consumption
through a qualitative lens. For example, political consumers could describe their family
political discussions, including the types of topics commonly discussed and how the
interactions typically went (e.g., there was a lot of disagreement or agreement). If
consumption choices were explicitly discussed in the family setting, participants could
detail those discussions and how they processed that information. It would also be
interesting to interview political consumers about the perceived efficacy of their actions,
and how that affects their degree of involvement in political consumption, as well as their
desire to engage in other political activities. This could shed more light on why political
consumers are often involved in additional offline and online political activities.
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